NL-KVK-27189542-SP16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Strategic Partnership 2016 NIMD - AWEPA - Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Strategic Partnership NIMD-AWEPA-MFA Conducive environments for effective policy influencing: the role of political parties and Parliaments The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has introduced a new funding framework for civil society organizations for the period 2016-2020. Under this new framework, a selected number of partners entered into a “Strategic Partnership” (hereinafter referred to as SP) with the MFA. In 2014, NIMD and AWEPA teamed up to prepare an application consisting of a Theory of Change and a Track record with input from in-country staff and partners. At the end of January 2015, the Dutch MFA announced that the NIMD/AWEPA alliance had been selected as one of the 25 organizations under the Strategic Partnership funding window and that the alliance would be entitled to a maximum of €6.410.250 per annum for a period of five years. In March this year, following the kick-off meeting organised by the MFA with all selected organizations to provide the framework for shaping the Strategic Partnership programme document, NIMD and AWEPA engaged with their counterparts from the Ministry to jointly formulate the strategic goal(s) for the partnership. This resulted in a document that defines the mutually agreed goals and geographical and thematic focus for the partnership which guided the preparations for the underlying programme document. The strategic goals and programme rationale and geographical focus for the partnership that follows from this agreement are briefly summarised below. Partnership goals The Partnership between NIMD, AWEPA and the MFA aims to contribute to a conducive environment in which political and civic actors can effectively lobby and influence political and policy processes to advocate for inclusive and equitable social change. Within this broad overarching goal, the partners jointly contribute to three specific goals: i. To improve the enabling environment for effective policy influencing on inclusive and equitable development in 10 countries in Africa and South-East Asia and 1 region (Central America) (system level change). ii. To strengthen the policy influencing capacities and responsiveness of political parties, parliaments, parliamentarians and civil society actors as drivers for inclusive social change through trust building, gender-sensitive agenda setting and inclusive dialogue in 10 countries and 1 region (actor and culture level change). iii. To develop the organisational capacities of a selected number of southern partner organizations (implementing partners, political parties and parliament) to autonomously and effectively advocate for effective policy influencing in partnership with civil society (actor level change). The themes of gender equality and inclusiveness are identified as important crosscutting themes for all proposed country and regional programmes. Chapter 3.3 outlines how NIMD and AWEPA plan to operationalise their strategy to enhance gender equality and inclusiveness in their programme activities. This general strategy is subsequently translated into country and region specific approaches as part of the country and regional programmes presented in chapter 6. Programme rationale The departing points for the NIMD-AWEPA Programme Document are a joint NIMD-AWEPA Theory of Change and the existing country programmes of both organizations (based on the DAC list of lower- and lower middle income countries, as stipulated by the Subsidy Framework). These country programmes –underpinned by an country specific ToC and baseline– are embedded in strong local political networks; are underpinned by a deep rooted knowledge of the local political economy and have a solid institutional infrastructure for programme implementation. To acknowledge the importance of cross-border themes and regional interdependencies that increasingly shape national policy agendas and to stimulate peer learning and exchange, dedicated strategies and instruments for peer learning, knowledge and innovation and PME will be developed as part of the strategic partnership. Furthermore, to maximize opportunities for regional and international lobby and advocacy on issues that emanate from national policy agendas, the programme foresees in the development of dedicated strategies for potential upstream policy influencing at regional and global fora and bodies.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIMD
NIMD
AWEPA
NIMD
+31 70 311 5464
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
6631190
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NL-KVK-27189542-TUN16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Tunisia Programme 2016
TUNISIA´S POLITICAL BACKGROUND In 2011 the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ took place which ended years of dictatorship in Tunisia and started the country on the path to democracy. This path has not been easy. There were two political murders which led to a stalemate in parliament for a while, and the process of drawing up and agreeing a new constitution took much longer than expected. Nevertheless, the new constitution was finally agreed and has been widely praised as one of the most progressive in the Arab world. In 2014, Tunisia held free and fair elections that resulted in a coalition government consisting of a party which had associations with the previous regime, working together with a party that had previously been declared illegal. So a democratic system is developing but there are still many challenges. For example, the political parties tend to be based on the personality of the leader rather than on a programme of policies, levels of trust between the politicians are quite low and the people working in politics tend to lack the skills and knowledge that they need to work effectively in a multiparty democracy. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN TUNISIA NIMD started working in Tunisia in 2012 and the core aim of NIMD’s programme has been building the capacity of the parties and politicians to work effectively in this new democracy and as part of that to encourage interparty dialogue. To achieve this, NIMD set up a School of Politics together with its local partner, Centre des Études Méditerranéennes Internationales. Here politicians work together in a multiparty setting to learn the skills and knowledge that they need to work together in a multiparty democracy. By learning together, they also get to know each other and get used to talking together which can help to increase trust and encourage interparty dialogue. By the end of 2014, 6 cohorts of politicians, approximately 180 people, had completed a programme. TSoP graduation NIMD has also set up an informal multiparty dialogue platform called ‘Couscous Politique’, where politicians informally discuss political issues while eating traditional Tunisian couscous. Mentoring programme Together with Demo Finland, NIMD is running a mentoring programme which pairs up regional and national politicians. This aims to help national politicians to learn more about issues at a regional level and vice versa. It also aims to improve multiparty dialogue at the regional level. Women’s Political Rights Programme Tunisia is also one of three counties where NIMD is running the Women’s Political Rights Programme. This programme is aimed at increasing the political participation of women in Tunisia, Colombia and Kenya.
Centre des Etudes Mediterraneennes et Internationales (CEMI)
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
Demo Finland
International IDEA
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
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Higher recognition and approval ratings of political actors by citizens.
% of Afrobarometer respondents expressing trust in political parties
The most recently available 2013-14 Afrobarometer measured public trust of respondents in the ruling party and in opposition parties separately. Combining these responses and collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is considerable trust in political parties in Tunisia. This trust is considerably lower in opposition parties (30%) than in the governing party (49%).
Concrete proposals for an accepted and equitable political system proposed and accepted.
Extent to which political actors at the national level experience an enabling environment that includes them in policy-making
Quantitative data: 2 (on a scale of 1-4) 1 - no voice and no influence on policy making 2 – able to take part in debates over policy making but do not necessarily feel their voice is being heard or that they exercise influence on the government 3 – able to take part in debates over policy making and sometimes feel or establish that their views are taken into account by the government 4 – fully able to participate in the political debate and exercise influence over the government Qualitative description: The participants of the focus group discussion were the leaders of seven political parties represented in parliament. They agreed that political actors, both those that are part of the ruling coalition and those that are part of the opposition, enjoy an acceptable margin of maneuver to influence public policy. However, this margin depends strongly on their individual position in the political scene, rather than on their status as elected representatives. As a result, the score was established as at the higher end of 2: ‘able to take part in debates over policy making but do not necessarily feel their voice is being heard or that they exercise influence on the government.’ All of the leaders present during the focus group discussion acknowledged that alumni of the Tunisian School of Politics have played an important role in drafting and influencing new public policies, thereby contributing to improved policy-making and increased influence on the government.
Existing safe spaces hosting a functional dialogue and/or cooperation platforms.
The leaders of the political parties believe that the country has progressed from the strong political instability which characterized the early years after the Jasmin Revolution. Political tensions do not threaten the stability of the country or democratic progress as much as they used to. They agree that it is now necessary to invest in safe spaces for dialogue between all relevant political and civic actors, to create an enabling environment for political actors to engage in inclusive policy making. The dialogue platform which was established in 2016 is one way to address this. Another is investing in capacity strengthening of political parties and individual politicians.
# of dialogue platforms in place and level of influence on policy formulation
Quantitative data: 1 (on a scale of 1-4) 1 – No influence 2 – Some of the discussions in the dialogue platform lead to policy initiatives, but whether these are successful depends on factors outside the sphere of influence of the platform 3 – The dialogue platform is in a position to address key political issues with policy initiatives and some of these are successful 4 – The dialogue platform is able to propose and implement policy initiatives autonomous of external factors Qualitative description: The participants in the focus group discussion were members of the dialogue platform established by CEMI. This included representatives of eight political parties represented in the Tunisian Parliament. The consensus was that the dialogue platform does not currently have influence on policy formulation. It was only established in 2016 and has not yet engaged in policy initiatives. Its role in the political spectrum has not yet been defined. However, the participants are full of ambition and are working on an agenda for the coming years. One of the key objectives of the programme will be to strengthen this platform and equip it with the skills needed to exercise influence on public policy.
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
One of the key objectives of the programme is to promote collaboration and consultation between political actors and between political and civic actors. The figures clearly show that such collaboration is present to a limited degree in current participants of the Tunisian School of Politics. Around half of them indicated that they regularly collaborate with other political or civic actors. Since this is a major focus of the programme, we hope and expect for this percentage to rise in future measurements. This expectation is confirmed by research among alumni of the Tunisian School of Politics. In order to determine the quality of such collaboration, additional research would be needed to assess what kinds of collaboration exist, e.g. political initiatives, joint projects, dialogue etc.
% of political actors (participants) who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors (including government actors) at least once monthly
Quantitative data: Current participants: 48% Breakdown: < 1 times monthly: 52% 2-3 times monthly: 18% 4-5 times monthly: 13% >5 times monthly: 17% Qualitative description: The survey was carried out among both current participants and alumni of the TSoP programme. The question was how often they collaborated with other political actors outside of TSoP activities. 48% of current participants indicate that they frequently collaborate with other political actors. For the sake of comparison, the same survey was also conducted among alumni of the TSoP. Among this population, a much higher percentage (88%) indicated that they frequently work together with other political actors. During their training within the TSoP, they are sensitized to the importance of collaborating with other political actors and gained experience learning and working in a multi-party setting. As a result, we would expect this percentage to rise for the current group of participants when measured again in 2018 or 2020. Results of the same survey carried out among alumni: < 1 times monthly: 12% 2-3 times monthly: 44% 4-5 times monthly: 14% >5 times monthly: 30%
Improved capacity of political actors in fragile settings to effective ad legitimately participate in political (dialogue) processes.
# of published political documents (manifestos, election programmes, position papers, policy proposals) by political parties that indicate being based on inputs from their defined support base (potential voters)
# of political parties trained
# of political parties trained
# of participants in capacity-building activities
# of participants in capacity-building activities
# of interparty dialogue meetings with constructive debate and concrete policy outcomes
# of interparty dialogue meetings with constructive debate and concrete policy outcomes
# of political actors who have been trained on the importance of dialogue with civil society/constituency
# of political actors who have been trained on the importance of dialogue with civil society/constituency
% of political actors who since the training have increased (amount/intensity) their interaction with civil society/their constituency
% of political actors who since the training have increased (amount/intensity) their interaction with civil society/their constituency
# of students that have successfully completed the Democracy Schools
# of students that have successfully completed the Democracy Schools ;
% of political actors who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors at least x per month
% of political actors who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors at least x per month
NL-KVK-27189542-KEN16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Kenya Programme 2016
KENYA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Kenya has a multi-party system in place since 1992, and has seen a steady economic development into a regional power. However, the existing patchwork of ethnic groups has become over the years a significant political issue, hindering democratic progress and creating domestic tensions. The low point of this setting showed in 2008, when after years of stability and economic growth, the world was shocked to witness the unexpected and severe intercommunal violence in the aftermath of the general elections. Over 1,100 people were killed and more than 500,000 were displaced, severely staining Kenya’s democratic and peaceful reputation. This traumatic period highlighted that Kenya’s ethnic politics from the past was still very much alive, but it also influenced the then-ongoing debate on the need for constitutional reform and overhaul of the governance system. Eventually, in 2010 a new constitution was written and promulgated through a national referendum. It was hailed as a progressive and democratic benchmark that also serves as guarantor of a broad set of human rights. Moreover, it entailed a completely new governance system by establishing 47 new county governments under a system of devolved government, with a two-tier structure in the legislature (adding a Senate) and division of functions and services between national and county level. The 2013 general elections were a first test of this new system and resulted in a win for the Jubilee alliance and their presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta from the Kikuyu dominated TNA party, with William Ruto from the Kalenjin led URP party as Deputy President. The opposition block CORD alliance mainly represents Luo, Luhya and Kamba communities, causing the current political landscape to be very polarized and ‘ethnicized’ THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN KENYA NIMD has been active in Kenya since 2003, when we assisted the setting-up of the Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD) as dialogue platform for all parliamentary parties. Since then, the NIMD programme has supported CMD-Kenya to host the interparty dialogue and to implement activities geared at supporting political parties and to strengthen their interrelation with broader society. By bringing parties together to find a common position, a joint solution can be advocated and lobbied for to ensure policy is changed. The recently set-up Leadership Institute contributes to changing perspectives and mind sets of the political class. Another important programme focus is strengthening the role of women and underrepresented groups in political life. Better functioning parties Although the new constitution guarantees certain human and political rights, a lot of changes still needed to be reflected in national legislation. The programme has worked with parties to comply with the new requirements in the Political Parties Act and the provisions in the constitution, and has collaborated with the Office of the Registrar for Political Parties to strengthen the party landscape by facilitating the development of party strategic plans. Leadership Training The NIMD programme has supported the establishment of the CMD Institute of Leadership and Governance that targets politicians and party cadre to build their knowledge and skills. There is no academic requirement to become a politician, but leadership and democratic values are essential for good functioning politics and governance. By training batches of (aspiring) politicians since January 2015, the Leadership Institute has ambitions to become a regional centre for learning as well. Read more… Women and youth The programme in Kenya has a long history of supporting the political rights of women, and especially in the run-up to elections where women candidates were supported and their agents trained. Since 2014 the Respect for Women’s Political Rights programme is implemented in Kenya, with the specific aim of changing perceptions and negative gender stereotyping around the issue of women political leadership. One of the key approaches in this is actually to find supportive men that act as theme ambassadors who can convince their fellow party members of the importance of removing gender barriers in Kenyan politics. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PRACTICE IN KENYA In 2003, NIMD set up the Centre for Multiparty Democracy in Kenya (CMD Kenya) to implement its programme. CMD Kenya is a political party dialogue platform. Its activities range from advocacy to facilitating dialogue and offering direct support to the political parties who are a member. One of the key themes within the platform is the role of women in Kenyan politics. The CMD platform has initiated several proposals to reduce formal barriers for women. The most notable process was the development of the new Constitution in 2010, where the NIMD programme lobbied for the inclusion of an affirmative action provision for women. The lobby was successful: Kenya’s new Constitution includes a strong Bill of Rights, ensures the participation of ethnic minorities, and stipulates that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies can be of the same gender. The new Constitution was a major victory for the women of Kenya, especially for those aspiring to take up a political role.
CMD Kenya
AWEPA
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
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Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5 Core Capabilities of NIMD's scan)
Local implementing partners increased their scores on NIMD's organizational scan (BART), which is based on the 5 C model
Quantitive description: CMD-K scores an average of 3.5 across all five measured capabilities. The specific scores are shown in the following table and figures. Results Max C1 Commit and Act 3,4 5 C2 Deliver Results 3,2 5 C3 Adapt and Self-Renew 3,3 5 C4 Attract and Relate 3,8 5 C5 Balance coherence and diversity 3,8 5 Qualitative description: In general, the organization’s higher scores on strategic coherence, accountability, consistency, and relevance demonstrate a strong base for positively impacting Kenya’s democratic consolidation over the long-term, even with frequent and rapid shifts in the political environment. Moreover, healthy alliances with international organizations, domestic legal structures, civil society organizations, and political parties offer opportunities for information sharing and coordination on programming, fundraising, and communication. These are the strong points of the organization and although they need to be maintained, they do not need to be built up any further. The focus of the capacity building programme for the coming years will be on the weaker capacities. The lowest scores were given on the capability delivering results with an average of 3.16. This score was particularly low on qualified staffing, infrastructure, and effectiveness. A first conclusion is that this points at the lack of a human resource system, risk policies and training of staff. This could be a first point of attention to focus capacity building activities on: developing a strategic and functioning human resource policy which includes a training strategy for staff. A second conclusion is that the M&E system could be developed further at CMD-K. Activity plans need to be measured and lessons need to be drawn from past experiences. M&E could be a second focus point for capacity building under the SP programme the coming years. Finally, a low score can also be seen on the healthy financial position and in specific CMD-K scored low on the question on a stable income. This touches on the most immediate worry of the organization to become financially healthy again. The conclusion of this exercise is that the capacity building activities for CMD-K under the SP will focus on three aspects: 1. Increasing the financial sustainability of the organization. This means help with cost cutting for sustainability in the short term and increasing capacity to fundraise for sustainability and developing the organization in the medium term. 2. Creating a strategic human resources policy. Which includes a staff training programme. 3. Developing the M&E system and to learn as an organization from past experiences.
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
% of political actors who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors at least x times per year
Although interaction and trust among political and between political and civil actors takes place, it is not regular or institutionalized. Actors seek interaction dependent on the issues at hand and that are in their own immediate interest. The relations between the actors are not characterized by trust or a sense of mutual understanding but are opportunistic in seeking coalitions to further their personal gains.
% of political actors who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors (including government actors) at least weekly = 50% Frequency of MP collaboration with other political actors Incidence as reported by MPs (n=10) Weekly 50% Bi-Weekly - Monthly 25% Quarterly 25% Every 6 months - Once a year - Other - The average frequency of inter-party collaboration over the past one year: 21 times a year, i.e. 0.4 times a week. Quantitative description: It emerged from the study that the level or frequency of interaction between political actors and government/other political parties was determined largely by the burning issue of the day. In light of the prevailing electoral reforms discussions, this topic has dominated the types and topic of interaction/collaboration between political parties and government. Feedback from the political parties indicated that there is a high level of interaction with the frequency of interaction dependent on the thematic issue. This would range from a frequency of daily with the current debate and controversy around electoral reforms to about quarterly for other issues such as internal dispute resolution. It however was noted that the level of interest and interaction for the political actors was largely determined by political economics i.e. will the party gain materially from the interaction and less by the interests of the citizenry.
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
% of political actors who indicate that collaborate with other civic actors at least x times per year
Although interaction and trust among political and between political and civil actors takes place, it is not regular or institutionalized. Actors seek interaction dependent on the issues at hand and that are in their own immediate interest. The relations between the actors are not characterized by trust or a sense of mutual understanding but are opportunistic in seeking coalitions to further their personal gains.
Quantitative data: 25% Frequency party collaboration with other political actors Incidence as reported by MPs (n=10) Weekly 25% Bi-Weekly 12.5% Monthly 12.5% Quarterly 12.5% Every 6 months - Once a year 25% Other 12.5% The average frequency of party collaboration with civic actors over the past one year: 19 times a year i.e. 0.36 times a week. Qualitative description: Through the inter-party consultative forums organized by CMD as well as other civil society actors, most political parties reported to having regular interactions. Most of the interaction between political parties and CSs was skewed towards interaction with CSs that were in the democratic capacity enhancement space e.g. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) among others where as CSs that were focused on governance oversight appeared not to feature in the list of collaborators mentioned.
Formulation of, proposing to, and approval of jointly formulated policies in parliament securing civil and political rights
# of (inclusive) policies jointly formulated and submitted to Parliament by the ruling and opposition parties (taking part in the dialogue platforms)
Over the past one year the political debate has been dominated with reforms around the electoral process and the body in charge of the electoral process. In the last one year, Three bills have been tabled in Parliament that touch on civil and political rights. These are; (i) The Elections Laws (Amendments) (No. 3) Bill 2015 No. 3; (ii) The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill 2016; (iii) The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Amendment) Bill 2016. The three bills were introduced by the Chair of the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) of the National Assembly Hon. Samuel Chepkonga, meaning that they are bills from the JLAC and hence bipartisan. JLAC has members from the following ruling Jubilee coalition parties: the National Alliance (TNA), United Republican Party (URP), and New FORD- Kenya (NFK). JLAC also has representation from the Kenya National Congress (KNC), and Federal Party of Kenya (FPK) which are opposition parties. The principal object of the first Bill was to amend the Elections Act, 2011 and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act, 2011, in order to address the concerns that resulted following the general election held on 4th March 2013, which was the first under the new constitutional dispensation. Central to the conduct of the elections are the constitutional role and responsibility of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), and the Judiciary. However the delivery of the 2013 elections, like many aspects of public administration and management involved interplay of several agencies, both State and non-state actors. It is these aspects that this Bill sought to redress. The principal object of the second amendment bill is to amend various provisions of the Constitution dealing with electoral disputes. It is based on experiential lessons obtained from the challenges previously experienced (particularly the presidential election petition of 2013) in the determination of electoral disputes. This amendment seeks to provide for mechanisms that will facilitate seamless determination of election petitions. Principally the bill seeks to extend the period of hearing a presidential election petition from 14 to 30 days. The principal object of the third bill is to amend the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act (No. 9 of 2011), in order to reorganize the procedure for appointment of chairperson and members of the Commission. The bill seeks to establish a Selection Panel that shall be drawn from parliamentary parties on account of their relative strength in the National Assembly. The bill aims to have the commissioners serve on part-time basis. It provides for the formation of a seven-member selection panel approved by Parliament to recruit commissioners. That would mark a departure from the current arrangement that gives the President leeway in appointing the commissioners.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
# of law making processes with active CS consultation
Assessment of literature from parliament and Kenya Law Reports indicates that there is a fair level of involvement from CSs in various legislative processes. Total number of bills with active CS consultation in 2015 and 2016: 21 out of 65. 6 of these 21 bills with CS consultation have been assented to by the President.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens, including % of Latino and Afro barometer responds
The most recently available 2013-14 Afrobarometer measured public trust of respondents in the ruling party and in opposition parties separately. Combining these responses and collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is considerable trust in political parties in Kenya. This trust is considerably lower in opposition parties (46%) than in the governing party (61%).
Political actors that voice and monitor citizen interests
# of published political documents (manifestos, election programmes, position papers, policy proposal) by political actors based on inputs from a defined support base (on improving gender equality and/or on inclusion)
Discussions with political party leaders revealed that all of them have published documents in one way or the other to guide their operations. Of the 27 CMD member parties surveyed, each had at least 2 policy documents. However, it could with strong probability be established that only 15 of such documents had been arrived at through input from a defined support base. Interviews among select political parties indicated that most political parties have at a minimum one of the following documents with larger political parties have multiple while the smaller parties would have 1 or none.
NL-KVK-27189542-MAL16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Mali Programme 2016
MALI’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Mali is one of the least developed countries in the world, ranked 176th out of 187 on the UN Human Development Index, with an average GDP per capita of $670. Located in the Sahel band, the territory is vast and landlocked (1.2 million km2) with little natural resources and a small domestic market. This challenging development context is exacerbated by an ongoing political and security crisis that affects the whole sub-region and most visibly since 2012. That year Mali encountered both an occupation of large parts of the country by rebel and jihadist forces, and a military coup d’état deposing two-term democratically elected president Touré. In 2013, after a military intervention led by France stopped the advance of jihadi forces, there was a formal restoration of constitutional rule with the election of new president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) and a new national assembly. In addition a UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) was deployed in 2013 to maintain peace and provide security for the population. The comprehensive Peace Accord that was signed between different armed groups and the Malian government in June 2015 opens new perspectives to improve the governance situation in the northern regions and to build peace in a fragile social-economic and multi-ethnic context. However, the weak state of the political system, characterized by a few opposition parties and weak linkages to people, combined with ongoing weak state capacity to deliver basic services such as health, food security and education cause the general population to disengage from the political process. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN MALI The NIMD programme in Mali started with exploratory visits and project through a local organisation in 2002/03. After several years of support and building relations and trust, NIMD facilitated the set-up of an independent political party dialogue platform in 2008: the Centre Malien pour le Dialogue Interpartis et la Démocratie (CMDID). Since then CMDID has been the main local partner and implementer of the NIMD programme, and the host of the interparty dialogue whereby all parliamentary parties are invited, plus representation of a large group of extra-parliamentary parties. Facilitate dialogue for political reforms The NIMD programme is focussed on supporting political reforms that improve the way political parties can operate and that ensures democratic elections and policy making can take place. Important issues have for instance been the need of one (rather than three) bodies that coordinate and organise the elections, the need for better rules around the rights of the opposition in parliament, and the need to update the political parties act. Strengthen links between parties and citizens In general the Malian parties are weakly organized and do not really represent the common interests of ordinary people. Moreover, also in policy making there is little formal role, as there is little opportunity to present changes to legislation as the presidential system ensures a powerful executive with a weak counterbalance from parliament. Our programme therefore works for better organized parties that better collaborate for policy change, and to link parties to citizens and civil society to better take up their issues and represent these on the national level. Build capacity for women and youth to participate Politics in Mali is dominated by older men, often the same men who were already politically active and involved at the start of the multiparty system back in 1992, and there is little room for women and youth to play a significant role. This is mainly due to conservative mindsets and cultural practices, as well as practical means; one needs resources to be active in politics. Therefore the NIMD programme has a clear focus on both building capacity (skills, knowledge) to empower women and youth, and on engaging with men to change these perceptions and practices.
Malian Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMDID)
AWEPA
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
308959
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Safe (and institutionalized) space for dialogue between all relevant political (and civic) actors
# of structural changes opening up space for greater engagement by political and civic actors, including # of structural changes and new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors + # of laws and mechanisms ensuring safe engagement between political and civic actors;
The prospect of the Algiers Peace Agreements has provided a new mechanism for co-operation between political actors and civil society to have exchanges and suggest proposals to make improvements to regional policies. Political actors and civil society have been highly consulted with respect to changes to the Agreement. Some points of convergence between certain politicians and civil society have been noted, although the actors from the two sides have been engaged separately. Consultations have also taken place between certain parties and CSOs condemning the institutionalisation of interim authorities, although generally speaking these points of convergence have not been the subject of reconciliation. The explanation for all of this would be how fragile co-operation is in the first place as well as the need for each actor to discuss the matter for visibility's sake rather than actually proving to be an influential factor on decisions
Political actors that voice and monitor citizen interests
# of published political documents (manifestos, election programmes, position papers, policy proposal) by political actors based on inputs from a defined support base (on improving gender equality and/or on inclusion)
The number of draft laws which have been amended as a result of dialogue between the parliamentary majority and the opposition
Currently there have been no draft laws submitted to vote which were the result of a harmonisation of the various points of views held by parliamentarian groups and in support of government actions and the opposition. Additionally, no formal dialogue structure between groups within the National Assembly is in place. As part of the CMDID platform two draft laws have been submitted for debate since 2015 between the majority and the opposition: the electoral law and political party charter. The political parties have duly considered the content of the laws and suggested modifications, with the draft law having been submitted to the National Assembly for due amendment and voting on. The CMDID Foundation and AWEPA have succeeded in implementing a monitoring committee made up of MPs and political leaders, whose mandate involves advocating for due consideration of the proposed changes to the platform by MPs.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens, including % of Latino and Afro barometer responds
Afrobarometer results are based on public opinion polls. The following questions were put forward to participants: "Are you confident in the party currently in power?" and "Are you confident in the opposition parties?" 59% of people who responded stated they were "Partially confident" or even "Very confident" in the party currently in power, with 43% saying they were confident in the opposition parties.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
% of political actors that experience an enabling environment in which they are involved in inclusive policy making
All of the MPs interviewed said they did not see the political environment as conducive in terms of being able to produce laws, pointing to the following factors: - The power held by the executive branch versus that held by the legislative branch, with the former controlling what is on the agenda for parliamentary sessions as well as restricting parliamentary legislative initiatives. - The high rates of MP turnover after each legislative election, preventing the continuity needed to work on producing laws. - Problems tied in to the recruitment of parliamentary staff, which is based more on candidates' political affiliations rather than their actual skillset, resulting in staff who are not qualified to support MPs in their legislative mandate. - Practical problems concerning MPs: outside of members of the parliamentary Leadership and committee Chairs, MPs do not have actual physical offices where they can perform legislative tasks, nor do they have support staff, with parliamentary assistants being solely assigned to standing committees. Regarding parties outside of parliament, recent experience shows they have often played the role of catalyst for reform without actually initiating things in this respect owing to the above-mentioned difficulties in terms of proposing laws.
Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5 Core Capabilities of NIMD's scan)
Local implementing partners increased their scores on NIMD's organizational scan (BART), which is based on the 5 C model
Quantitative data: Results Max C1 Commit and Act 4.4 5 C2 Deliver Results 3.9 5 C3 Adapt and Self-Renew 3.5 5 C4 Attract and Relate 4.3 5 C5 Balance coherence and diversity 4.7 5 Results Max C1 Strategic planning 4.6 5 Leadership 5.0 5 Healthy financial position 3.5 5 C2 Human resources 3.9 5 Infrastructure 3.7 5 Efficiency 5.0 5 Effectiveness 2.9 5 Relevance 3.5 5 C3 Understanding Contexts 4.0 5 Flexibility 5.0 5 Adequate PM&E 2.3 5 Encourage learning 2.8 5 Up-to-date communication 3.7 5 C4 Alliances 3.0 5 Legitimacy 4.0 5 Integrity 5.0 5 Accountability 5.0 5 C5 Strategically coherent 5.0 5 Consistency 5.0 5 Balanced Stability 4.5 5 Inclusiveness 4.3 5
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
Intensity of collaboration between political actors, and between political and civic actors
Level = medium Exchanges between MPs and civil society are frequent and occur mainly within the framework of the standing committees who invite CSOs to hearings for relevant legislation (e.g. the law on the creation of the National Observatory of Cities was subject to intense consultation between the Law Committee and civil society). Contact likewise also occurs via parliamentary thematic networks such as the Women Parliamentarians' Network (REFEP), who frequently consult with CSOs on gender-related matters and activities. Lastly this contact also occurs at the personal initiative of MPs, who are requested by CSOs on a daily basis to advocate for causes against other parliamentarians. Nevertheless, the quality of these interactions is not optimal as they remain quite formal and restrictive (as they are only for specific legal texts). Outside of Parliament co-operation between political and civic actors is difficult and almost non-existent. Relationships are not institutionalised and mutual suspicion and manipulation is common. It should be noted nevertheless that the CMDID has involved civil society organisations in all of its activities starting from 2013 and takes into account civil actors' contributions when considering political matters. This experience is behind the above statement that no sustained, organised co-operation is in place.
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
The level of co-operation between political actors
Level = Medium (2) All of the MPs interviewed stated they regularly work together with governmental actors. Contact in this regard occurs as part of their work as parliamentarians, with government members being present during Parliament plenary sessions and frequently summoned by standing committees. The actual frequency with which this happens is down to the parliamentary schedule, with contact on a daily basis occurring when Parliament is in session. Moreover, this contact happens as a result of MPs' personal initiatives, who frequently meet with political actors from the government or from their own political parties. However, actors from political parties have noted that even though they regularly work alongside MPs, the latter do not always toe party line, with priority being given to their own personal interests.
NL-KVK-27189542-BEN16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Benin Programme 2016
BENIN´S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Benin has a relatively stable multiparty system, with five successful presidential and legislative elections held since the early 1990s, most of which have been deemed free and fair. However, many democratic challenges remain, both politically and economically. As for the overall situation in parliament, there are 4 main party alliances and a considerable number of politically unaffiliated individuals or small parties. Political parties are in general very weak, with very few parties working according to an actual structure with members, a manifesto and so on. The current president, Yayi Boni, is near the end of his second term which will end March 2016. The alliance ‘Forces Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent’ (FCBE), made up of many parties and other actors, supports the president but has lost quite some ground in the April 2015 elections. PRB and RB-RB are established but struggling parties, and the main oppositional alliance ‘Union fait la Nation’ (UN) is seeking to move towards becoming one party. Meanwhile, within FCBE many ‘mini-parties’ and organizations exist but mostly only in name. Political life therefore seems to revolve around key individuals, mainly MPs, who do not seem to have a very strong link to their respective parties. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN BENIN 2012 saw the roll-out of the first operational phase after the decision in 2011 to jointly explore a programme with the Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA). From 2012 to 2015 NIMD and AWEPA have worked on a basic approach of combining the NIMD objective of facilitating interparty dialogue and strengthening political parties with a clear focus on the role and functioning of parliament and the interactions between the parties in parliament. Next to training session for parliamentary staff and MP’s, the annual two rounds of public hearings with parliamentary multiparty delegations through the country are one of the most successful and locally appreciated activities. In 2015, the programme piloted a first class of a potential Benin School of Politics. The new more balanced and more fluid composition of parliament and the political party landscape potentially offer new doors to revive interparty dialogue and broad inclusive stakeholder dialogue on democratic reform of the political system. The school programme will be continued in 2016. Exchange activities The Benin programme has been quite active in linking up international politicians to share experiences with politics in Benin. AWEPA’s president and Minister of State, Ms Miet Smet, and NIMD’s Supervisory Board member, Mr Eimert van Middelkoop, participated in the 2012 opening parliamentary conference in Benin. In 2013, MP Ingrid de Caluwé of the VVD participated in a conference on Interparty Dialogue. French MP Bernard Lesterlin from the friendship committee of the French Assemblée joint the Beninese parliamentary delegation during public hearings throughout the country in 2014. And Beninese delegations went on learning missions to Senegal and Tunisia in 2014 and 2015. Steering Committee NIMD and AWEPA have established a Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage) composed of MP’s and political party senior leadership to guarantee local ownership and guidance over the programme design. The programme is presently managed by a local coordinator with supervision from AWEPA and NIMD headquarters in The Netherlands.
AWEPA
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
99950
7315
30000
99950
75000
NL-KVK-27189542-MOZ16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Mozambique Programme 2016
MOZAMBIQUE’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Mozambique became independent in 1975. After a long and bloody civil war between rebel movement Renamo and the Frelimo government, a Peace Agreement was signed in 1992. With the Peace Agreement, Mozambique adopted the system of multiparty democracy. For a long time, Frelimo and Renamo dominated the political arena in Mozambique, with Frelimo being overwhelmingly dominant and holding an absolute majority in parliament. In 2009, the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) entered the political scene and presented itself as a new political force. Despite more than 20 years of peace and relative stability, the civil war between Renamo and Frelimo still shapes the political reality of today. The ruling and main opposition parties still tend to see each other as enemies. This can be seen in the political discourse and makes it difficult for them to reach consensus. Since 2012, the political tensions between ruling party Frelimo and former rebel movement Renamo have been rising, resulting in low-intensity confrontations between the government and the opposition. Mozambique’s rapid economic expansion over the past 20 years, which is mainly a result of the booming natural resources industry, has had only a moderate impact on poverty reduction and the distribution of wealth. This has led to increased social discontent and political confrontations. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN MOZAMBIQUE NIMD’s work in Mozambique started in 2000. The programme activities mainly focus on trying to reduce the tensions between the parliamentary parties and tries to create space for dialogue and constructive collaboration. The programme facilitates training on dialogue skills for the members of the parties and stimulates the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders (civil society organizations, church leaders and the international community). Capacity strengthening The programme furthermore aims to contribute to a safe environment for elections by facilitating dialogue sessions between the political parties and the electoral management body (CNE), In order to enable the political parties in Mozambique to contribute in an effective way to electoral activities, NIMD supports the parliamentary political parties to strengthen their organizational and programmatic capacities. The basis for these activities are the multi-annual strategic plans of the parties that were developed with support of NIMD. Democracy Schools In the current tense political climate and economic situation, the voice of the citizens in Mozambique often remains unheard. Citizens, local authorities, and political leaders often have insufficient capacity and incentives to initiate and maintain constructive and inclusive dialogue and interaction. To foster democratic behaviour and facilitate the creation of space for dialogue and cooperation between citizens and local authorities, NIMD facilitates democracy education programmes at provincial level. The democracy schools in Mozambique promote active citizenship and strengthen citizen engagement in local governance through practical leadership training programmes. By doing so, NIMD aims to contribute to the creation of a new generation of young politicians with democratic values and with the skills to act as agents of change.
IMD Mozambique
AWEPA
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
Demo Finland
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
319878
37500
8891
319878
53315
79769
153494
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
% of opposition parties that consider members of the governing party as constructive partner in policy development and implementation
Quantitative data: 0% for opposition parties and 100% for civic actors Do not see as partners See as partners All Political actors Who consider governing party as partner All opposition parties (n=6) 100% (2) 0% (0) RENAMO (n=4) 100% (4) 0% (0) MDM (n=2) 100% (2) 0% (0) Final result of the indicator for opposition parties 0 All CS stakeholders (n=7) 0% (0) 100% (7) Final result of the indicator for CS stakeholders 7 Qualitative description: The political actors have a problem of trusting each other. This is particularly complicated when it comes to establishment of working partnership between RENAMO and FRELIMO. The two parties recognize that their political history has had a major effect on developing an effective working relationship. RENAMO members interviewed stated that FRELIMO was not open and interested in promoting democratic policy dialogue within the country, and was not prepared to accept outside FRELIMO policy inputs, especially when it came from the opposition party such as RENAMO which they consider to be a long term enemy. The information collected reveals that despite the mistrust between the two parties, during the time of President Joaquim Chissano administration the political environment was significantly conducive for the opposition parties’ collaboration with the ruling party/government in many important policy processes. They understand that during that time the two parties were always able to find common ground and interests in order to work together for the benefit of socio-political and economic development of the country. They consider that this good political working environment deteriorated since President Guebuza and continued with the new elected President Mr. Nyusi. Additionally to the current political and economic and governance problems which Mozambique is experiencing, this started during the second term of President Guebuza. The political environment for the opposition parties to operate freely and collaborate on common developmental policy have become structurally and systematically limited. An example was the arrest of a senior member of RENAMO, Mr. Antonio Muchanga, just after the meeting of members of the State Council at the presidential office. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Muchanga was both an MP and a member of the state Council, which in fact gave him political immunity, but this was immediately removed in that meeting. The political actors interviewed from RENAMO believe that been the two major political actors in the country an eventual collaboration in policy making and implementation is critical. But eventually collaboration would be possible after the two parties have reached an agreement on the political and military national conflicts causes, such as the decentralization/provincial autonomy process, and the Joaquim Chissano Conference Center conversations (which was stopped after the outbreak of the military attacks by government forces and opposition parties). Contrary to the perception of RENAMO, the political actors from the FRELIMO perception is that the political environment is conducive for the political actors to collaborate in policy making and implementation process and, Mozambique have all legal-framework to allow the opposition parties to operate freely since they political actions are based on the national constitution. The FRELIMO Political actors also said that they always open to receive new policy ideas and inputs from all national political and developmental stakeholders. However, they highlighted that the problem is the opposition parties who are not prepared and also do not have the capacity to actively participate in national politics using democratic means. The MDM on the other hand indicated that their relationship with FRELIMO is not healthy. Further their relations with FRELIMO are often complicated, especially at local, provincial, district and municipality levels were the MDM is in power as such as Nampula, Quelimane and Beira. In terms of working relationship between MDM and RENAMO, the MDM members interviewed revealed that their relationship with RENAMO is at lower level but does not necessary have a great impact on political activities of the both parties. Although political parties recognize the gains of collaboration in Mozambique, not all political actors see each other’s as partners in the process on development and implementation of legislation. Data reveled political actors from the opposition do not perceive the ruling political party and MPs as their partners (67% RENAMO, 33% MDM). Only FRELIMO (100%) consider other parties and MPs as partners.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Extent to which civic actors experience an enabling environment in which they can influence/are involved in inclusive policy making
Quantitative data: 0% Not Enabling Partially Enabling Enabling All SC actors (n=7) 71% (5) 29% (2) 0% (0) n=5 n=2 n=0 Academics 100% (3) 0% (0) 0% (0) NGOs 50% (2) 50% (2) 0% (0) Final result of the indicator 0% (0) Qualitative description: The collected information reveals that the government of Mozambique recognizes civic actors as key partners in the process of building inclusive and sustainable political and socio-economic development and this is reflected in the national constitution. Furthermore, they recognize that civic actors’ have the right to participate in democratic policy dialogue with government. However, in spite of an existing national comprehensives legal-framework and formal mechanisms to promote civic actors’ participation in the policy making and implementation process, the level of trust and collaboration has deteriorated significantly in the past years. The civic actor understanding is that the political environment for their participation is very limited and that there is an increasing level of political intolerance and intimidation of different actors who think differently to government or the ruling party. Civic actors and academics feel that they are consulted in order to legitimize the process. However the government does not necessary take their input into a consideration within the policy making process. Additionally, the civic actors believe that the government is not interested in communicating and promoting a dialogue about key aspects of the national development policy. Some of the individuals who were interviewed revealed that the reason for this deteriorating relationship is mainly because of the current economic and political governance challenges that are ongoing in the country, specifically the prolonged political-military conflict (involving RENAMO armed-men and the government military-forces). The recent economic financial public scandals, such as the public debit, EMATUM and unclear military material deals have been some of the main reasons for the conflict. Other aspects on which civic actors and academics believe that government has become more intolerant in the last few years include the contention regarding the possible decentralization of government, the attempt of prohibiting civic protests related to social discontent such as socio-economic grievances, corruption and the exclusion of citizens within a democratic process, and the increasing cases of kidnappings and unexplained assassinations (Professor Gilles Cistac, Persecutor Marcelo Vilankulo and the recent shooting of the scholar and TV political commentator, Prof. Jaime Macuane). This data reveals that despite the achievements of the recognition of civic actors in the political process within the national constitution, the level of political engagement and collaboration between government and civil actors, is still low. Furthermore the political environment is characterized by fear and insecurity, which creates a context of distrust between the actors, further fuelling a tradition of non-collaboration between various stakeholders in the political process.
Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5 Core Capabilities of NIMD's scan)
Local implementing partners increased their scores on NIMD's organizational scan (BART), which is based on the 5 C model
Quantitative data: 3.7 (5C average) Commit and act 3.7 Deliver results 3.3 Adapt and self-renew 3.6 Attract and relate to external stakeholders 3.9 Balance coherence and diversity 3.9 Qualitative description: The results of the organisational assessment scan demonstrate that the IMD Mozambique is perceived to be relatively strong organisation with a broad range of capabilities thanks to the transference of experienced staff and fundamental resources from NIMD country office. The organisation scores particularly high on the i) ability to relate to external stakeholders, with 3.9; ii) balance coherence and diversity, 3.9 and iii) Capable to commit and act with 3.7. The relatively lower scores, although not bad, corresponds to the i) capability of adapting and self-renewing with 3.6 and capability of delivering results with 3.3. In general, the strengths of the organization reflected on the high score of the many dimensions were inherited from the NIMD-CO performance. More specifically, the participants indicated that the IMD Office is considered to be a strategically effective organization with consistent programs, has good leadership composed by national board members, develop and implement relevant programs and integrity political situations and challenges. Based on the previous NIMD office, the staff have proven to be able to deliver results according to the plans. These qualities also became clear in a recent appraisal done by the Finnish Embassy for another programme which classified IMD has having strong HR capacities for the program implementation, although some improvements has to be done on HR policy. Besides these strengths, a number of points for improvement were also mentioned. E.g. the approval of an adequate HR policy, the organisation has to put in place sufficient risk policies, more encouragement of learning, the source of funds has to be diversified; simple and participatory M&E system; more flexibility on the decisions of the NIMD-HQ related to the resource mobilization. With regard to external communication it was pointed out the need to give more visibility of IMD as an autonomous Mozambican organization although always important to advertise the natural partnership with NIMD. It was also given the suggestion to move forward with the previous idea of creation of a communication plan and media strategy. In that regard in the coming months IMD will have to create its website to profile its activities and intensify relations with media.
Improved capability to attract and relate of political actors
# of types of collaborations between MPs and political actors or CS stakeholders that are perceived as being active
# of active alliances between political actors and/or between political actors and CS stakeholders
Figure 1.2: Types of collaboration between different actors according to the qualitative information collected in the interview Different actors Not active Partially active Active Ruling party/opposition parties ● Opposition parties themselves ● Opposition parties/ Civil society ● Ruling party/Civil society ● MPs /Civil society ● Qualitative description: The political actors that were interviewed identified three mechanisms of collaboration between them, namely: (i) Sharing of information, (ii) Consulted meetings and (iii) joint activities. The civil society organizations that were interviewed identified five mechanisms of collaboration among them and with political actors, namely: (i) Development of laws; (ii) Participation in debates, (iii) Participation in consultation sessions, (iv) Provision of capacity to some parties and through (v) Providing inputs to the electoral manifest for some politic parties. All of the respondents (politics actors, MPs and civil society stakeholders) stated that they collaborate with each other. These actors have a similar perception about the level of collaboration between with each other, for instance 70% of political actors view their collaboration with civic actors as being active and 30% of them as being partially active. Likewise, 71% of civil stakeholder’s have an active collaboration with political actors, while 29% think that their collaboration is partially active. Although evidences from the field indicate there is active collaboration between civic and political actors, this collaboration does vary between actors. In the current legislative term, most MP’s from RENAMO and MDM indicate that they consult civic actors mainly on imminent legislative debates, meaning that frequency of this collaboration varies from occasion to occasion. While there are peak periods such as during the electoral season, when laws proposals are under discussion, both political and civic actors tend to collaborate more intensively. However, there are times when collaboration is required but challenges arise which prohibit effective collaboration. Most representatives from the opposition political parties and civil society pointed out several challenges that limit their collaboration with the government. These challenges were traced back to 1994. The main challenge identified includes the claim that the process of peace building, democratization and decentralization was imperfect which mainly benefited the ruling party and excluded other key political actors such as RENAMO. The representatives interviewed believe that this is the reason for of the current socio-political and economic inequalities as well as military conflicts in Mozambique. Furthermore, despite the progress made in some areas no political space for government, political and civil actors to work together has been established in the country. The Mozambican state and government has not yet consolidated an adequate system of checks and balances in governance processes; within the decentralization process of power and institutions this has also not been completed yet. Participants also regard the judiciary system as not being totally independent from government interests. Furthermore, the lack of a culture of sharing information and the lack of skills of most political and civil actors was considered to be a key barrier to greater engagement between various stakeholders. Although Political actors stated that they have a close collaboration with civic actors, civic actors claim that such collaboration is conditional on the interest coming from the political parties. Whereas collaboration tends to be more difficult when it is requested by civil actors. Civil society organizations indicated that they faced challenges of having their plans or request for information accepted by politic parties which shows certain levels of mistrust, even though their request may be accepted at a later state. They also stated that they often used informal channels to access information from political actors. Thus one conclusion that can be made is that civil society organizations may be serving the interests of specific political parties. Despite the above mentioned challenges civil society organizations have collaborated with political actors in the development of many laws such as the law against domestic violence (2009); Family law (2004); revision of the criminal code (2014) as well as participating in debates, consultation sessions, collaboration through capacity building of party members and have also given inputs to the electoral manifesto of some politic parties. On the basis of the information that was collected, it is concluded that the collaboration between the political parties, as well as that between civil society and political parties, still needs improvement. Further, more space for formal dialogue and for the increased inclusion of civil society stakeholders needs to be established or used effectively in order to allow for better collaboration in the process of policy development and implementation.
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
% of civic actors that that consider members of the governing party as constructive partner in policy development and implementation
Political actors (mainly MPs) and civic actors see each other as important partners in the process of policy making and implementation, with 100% of both actors seeing each other as partners in process of policy making and implementation to enhancing a national inclusive and sustainable socio-political and economic growth and development. There has been some successful policy collaboration and partnership between civic political actors. The civic actors were able to strongly influence the processes. Some laws that have been passed in the parliament and enacted by the executive which were proposed by civil society, for Instance, the Law against Domestic Violence (2009) and the new Family Law (2004) were both suggested by the civil society. Although the civil society views political actors as partners they are aware that challenges still exist and improvements are required, especially when it deals with issues of trust and partnership with the MPs from the ruling party and the government. The civic actors revealed and criticized the ruling party’s MPs and government because of some cases in which laws and policy formulation were approved and adopted by the government based on top-down approach, ignoring all possible inputs from the civil society. The interviewed civic actors also revealed that their participation in policy making and implementation has deteriorated since the period the opposition parties stated (the second terms of the President Guebuza and continue to President Nyusi government). Since then they perceive that the government and national parliament often does not respect the existing mechanisms of policy dialogue among government and civil society. The room given to civil society for contributing in policy making and implementation is getting limited; the time usually allocated to them is not enough to provide sound inputs. For instance, the scholars interviewed in this baseline study feel that in significant cases they were consulted for a practically policy making process but most of their inputs were not integrated into the final product in the form of implemented policy. The civic actors revealed that they relationship with government becomes challenging after the civil society national agenda had shifted from simple humanitarian developmental services delivery organization but also to extend their interests in economic and governance agendas. This was mainly significant in increasing social inequalities and poverty while the wealth of the country is continually concentrated in the minority (political elite of FRELIMO). With the discovery of natural resources, the civil society have significantly increased their demand for good governance, inclusive and sustainable resources development and management policy which would allow the government and state to be transparent and accountable to its citizens.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
% of political actors that experience an enabling environment in which they are involved in inclusive policy making
Quantitative data: 40% Not Enabling Partially Enabling Enabling All Political actors (n=10) 50% ( 5) 10% (1) 40% (4) n=8 n=1 n=1 FRELIMO 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (4) RENAMO 75% (3) 25% (1) 0% (0) MDM 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) Final result of the indicator 40% (4) Qualitative description: Both FRELIMO and RENAMO acknowledge that the working environment between them has deteriorated over the years, more so since the last presidential and legislative elections. In order to restore the positive working relationship between RENAMO and FRELIMO there are many important aspects that would need to be addressed first at a high political level by the two parties and government. These aspects include the causes of political and military conflicts (such as decentralization/provincial autonomy) and reaching a security and peace agreement on the Joaquim Chissano Conference Center conversations. The MDM also indicated that its relationship with both RENAMO and FRELIMO has not been healthy. Further the relation with the ruling party has often been complicated, especially at local, provincial, district and municipality levels. The collected information reveals that there is also a lack of trust among the opposition parties (MDM and RENAMO), for instance only on a few occasions have they been able to reach consensus in parliament. An example of this is the case of 2012 where the two parties were able to join forces and vote against a government/ruling party law proposal regarding the Public Probity Law.
Political actors that voice and monitor citizen interests
# of published political documents (manifestos, election programmes, position papers, policy proposal) by political actors based on inputs from a defined support base (on improving gender equality and/or on inclusion)
Quantitative data: 0 Qualitative description: The collected information reveals that there is no political document, such as a manifesto, election program, position paper or policy proposal approved or adopted by political parties based specifically on the inputs from a defined support base (such as women and youth league party representatives). The key finding is that the three political parties (FRELIMO, MDM and RENAMO) despite the fact that both their youth and women members are of the opinion that they are significantly included in political party activities through formal mechanisms, such as through youth and women leagues. However, they believe that their inclusion is still not sufficient to ensure that their particular interests and demands are met. Political activity is still regarded as man’s activity and age is a key determinant for assuming political leadership. Furthermore, women and youth believe that their participation in critical decisions processes of their political parties is still weak. These groups did not indicate whether their parties had policies in place aimed at enhancing effective political participation of women and youth. In addition to the lack of policy, it was also revealed that the process of inception and implementation of women and youth political inclusiveness takes a linear form which is developed at a central level and cascades to their leagues, with their role being to follow up and implement orders coming from the central level. The women interviewed also revealed that their parties’ strategies and documents inceptions and implementation was not reflective of what had been discussed with them and their inputs.
NL-KVK-27189542-UGA16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Uganda Programme 2016
UGANDA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND In 1986, Yoweri Museveni became president. Under his reign, an end was put to a violent period of political instability and the economy slowly improved. Museveni also introduced a new political system, whereby political parties were not allowed and politicians were elected on personal merit, not party affiliation. In 2005, the majority of Ugandans voted in a referendum for re-introducing multiparty politics. This was followed in 2006 by the first multiparty elections in twenty years. Despite this, Uganda is de facto a one-party state and still has a polarized political system. Opposition parties only have a limited ability to influence the political reform agenda. So the country’s political system remains very fragile and political parties themselves face several challenges. For example, the parties largely rely on the appeal of their leaders rather than policies, face internal divisions, lack accountability and internal democracy and are not strongly organized. As Uganda nears the run-up to the 2016 general elections, concerns heighten over shrinking space for legitimate political activities. For example, the Public Order Management Act, which was introduced at the end of 2013, places restrictions on public meetings. One consequence is that opposition parties find it increasingly challenging to organize rallies. The much needed constitutional and electoral reforms are also not coming off the ground, despite a large public outcry and concerted efforts by a plethora of stakeholders including political parties for reforms. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN UGANDA NIMD’s overall objective in Uganda is to help foster a well-functioning, strong and vibrant multiparty democracy. We do this by focusing both on facilitating an inclusive political dialogue between the parties and helping the parties to develop into mature organizations with a sound organizational structure and a distinctive programmatic identity. In 2010, the six parliamentary parties, with NIMD’s support, established an informal interparty dialogue process (IPOD). Establishing this marked a turning point in multiparty politics in Uganda as both the ruling party and opposition committed to regularly engaging with each other in a dialogue process aimed at addressing challenges facing Uganda. This process is facilitated on behalf of the six parties by NIMD-Uganda, a registered organization in the capital Kampala. Party Capacity Strengthening In 2014, NIMD also established the Political Party Capacity Strengthening Facility (PPCSF) in Uganda for member parties of IPOD. In NIMD’s experience, ruling parties are more willing to engage with opposition political parties who act programmatically and have a clear constituency. This also allows them to play ‘more on the ball and less on the adversary’. Through strengthening the capacity and internal democracy of Ugandan political parties, the PPCSF facilitates Ugandan political parties to become more effective players in Uganda’s multiparty system. For example, Project Implementation Committees have been set up by some political parties to define the strategic priorities for the party. It is run by a Project Management Unit located at NIMD’s Uganda office. Outlook As tensions rise ahead of 2016 elections, the NIMD programme in Uganda focuses its efforts at three levels: Keep the interparty dialogue process going and to secure agreement on electoral reforms and build alliances and support for these in the wider stakeholder community; Prepare the parties for the 2016 elections and beyond by strengthening their organizational and programmatic capacities; Contribute to the peaceful conduct of the 2016 elections by investing in de-escalating mechanisms that enable looming political tensions to be spotted early on and provide an informal platform in which political parties can let off steam.
NIMD Uganda
AWEPA
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
Democratic Governance Facility
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
419567
7480
45000
419567
60000
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
% of political actors that experience an enabling environment in which they are involved in inclusive policy making
Quantitative data: 100 percent of opposition political actors interviewed indicated the political environment does not enable them to influence policy making. This figure is contrasted by political actors from the ruling party who find the environment enabling. Therefore baseline = 0 Qualitative description: Parliament remains a key institution for influencing policy given its legislative power. The possibility to table private members’ bills is a policy window through which political parties can present law and policy proposals. Civil society actors can also cooperate with members of parliament to sponsor policy proposals under this window. There are, however, limitations: First, with less than 15 percent of the seats in parliament, opposition parties require the buy-in of the ruling party to pass laws. Second, official procedure requires sponsors of parliamentary bills to first obtain a certificate of financial implications. The required certificate is given by the ministry of finance thereby providing the executive with a strong leverage over what makes it to the parliamentary agenda. During interviews and focus group discussions, political party representatives indicated that the possibility to influence law and policy making is limited to topics that are “not politically contentious” or where (sic) “the ruling party has no embedded interest.” Outside parliament, the political parties especially those in opposition do not enjoy a conducive space to engage in policy debates due to challenges with access to vital information and capacity of the political parties to conduct research.
Safe (and institutionalized) space for dialogue between all relevant political (and civic) actors
# of dialogue platforms in place
There is an operational Interparty Dialogue Platform (IPOD), which was founded in 2010. All the four parliamentary political parties subscribe to IPOD. In the past legislature period, IPOD had an agreed agenda aligned to the critical concerns such as the pursuit of a level playing field through proposing electoral reforms and negotiating modalities for political party financing. Whenever need arose, key relevant civic actors provided expert input to IPOD work. During the period, the IPOD membership also commenced discussions regarding institutionalisation of the platform, which are still ongoing.
There is one interparty dialogue platform—the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD). Its membership includes the four political parties represented in the current (10th) parliament namely: Democratic Party (DP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), National Resistance Movement (NRM) and Uganda People’s Congress (UPC). Business in IPOD is steered by a Council of Secretary Generals (SGs), where each of the member parties has three representatives including the SGs. In the previous legislature period, the IPOD Council held meetings once every month. Representation in IPOD processes can be ranked on a scale of 1 – 4, where: 4 = representation by party presidents and chairpersons 3 – representation by secretary generals 2 – representation by party official with mandate of SGs 1 – representation by party officials In view of the above scale, the current level of representation lies between 2 and 3. All parties have representatives mandated by the SGs while some of the parties have their SGs participating regularly in IPOD council discussions. Qualitative description: IPOD is growing as a preferred space for dialogue among the political parties. However, it faces commitment issues and low trust levels among political actors. The IPOD Council of SGs is functional but the Summit of Party Presidents has not met. There are concerns about the effectiveness of party representatives on the IPOD council: some do not have the necessary mandate to commit their political parties during IPOD negotiations. Furthermore, the inclusion of civil society and special groups in IPOD business is still weak, although sub committees have been set-up to engender this.
Safe (and institutionalized) space for dialogue between all relevant political (and civic) actors
Level of representation at the dialogue platform
Quantitative data: There is one interparty dialogue platform—the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD). Its membership includes the four political parties represented in the current (10th) parliament namely: Democratic Party (DP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), National Resistance Movement (NRM) and Uganda People’s Congress (UPC). Business in IPOD is steered by a Council of Secretary Generals (SGs), where each of the member parties has three representatives including the SGs. In the previous legislature period, the IPOD Council held meetings once every month. Representation in IPOD processes can be ranked on a scale of 1 – 4, where: 4 = representation by party presidents and chairpersons 3 – representation by secretary generals 2 – representation by party official with mandate of SGs 1 – representation by party officials In view of the above scale, the current level of representation lies between 2 and 3. All parties have representatives mandated by the SGs while some of the parties have their SGs participating regularly in IPOD council discussions. Qualitative description: IPOD is growing as a preferred space for dialogue among the political parties. However, it faces commitment issues and low trust levels among political actors. The IPOD Council of SGs is functional but the Summit of Party Presidents has not met. There are concerns about the effectiveness of party representatives on the IPOD council: some do not have the necessary mandate to commit their political parties during IPOD negotiations. Furthermore, the inclusion of civil society and special groups in IPOD business is still weak, although sub committees have been set-up to engender this.
Formulation of, proposing to, and approval of jointly formulated policies in parliament securing civil and political rights
# of (inclusive) policies jointly formulated and submitted to Parliament by the ruling and opposition parties (taking part in the dialogue platforms)
Qualitative data: IPOD presented to the legal and parliamentary affairs committee joint positions on electoral and constitutional amendment bills. It included 43 proposals for political and electoral reforms. There were also some unsuccessful efforts to present joint position to the committee of defense and internal affairs on the NGO bill. Qualitative description: Outside the informal arrangements of political parties, there was yet another attempt in 9th Parliament by a coalition of MPs and CSOs to sponsor Private Member’s Bills. The coalition of MPs was composed of NRM, Opposition and independent MPs. Efforts of this coalition were unsuccessful because NRM MPs silently withdrew from the activity due to pressure from the party. The failure by IPOD to present joint positions to Parliament led the passage of clauses in the bills, especially the NGO bill that are unfavorable to operations of CSOs and unleveled the playing field for political parties. Quantitative description: The composition of committees in Parliament follows strict gender sensitive criteria of including a mandatory 1/3 (one third) of women committee members. In 9th Parliament the minimum number of women MPs on every committee was 6/20 (six out of twenty) MPs. 1/3 (One third) of the entire committee leadership of session committees was women. The Speaker rejected any proposals for composition of committees that violated this criterion.
Political actors that voice and monitor citizen interests
# of published political documents (manifestos, election programmes, position papers, policy proposal) by political actors based on inputs from a defined support base (on improving gender equality and/or on inclusion
Quantitative data: During the time of the 2016 elections a total four political parties (CP, FDC, NRM and UPC) under the IPOD framework each developed a manifesto document. The two parties (DP & JEEMA) did not publish individual election manifestos as they had joined election alliances and therefore subscribed to group manifestos. Nevertheless they were able to develop specific position papers on topics such as agriculture, education, and employment. DP developed three papers while JEEMA had eight. Qualitative description: In the last legislative period, there is evidence that political parties involved women and youth as well as workers and PWD groups to feed into their policy and election manifesto development processes. NRM and FDC, for example, had extracts of the voice of the women in their respective manifestos.
Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5 Core Capabilities of NIMD's scan)
Local implementing partners increased their scores on NIMD's organizational scan (BART), which is based on the 5 C model
Baseline description: An organizational scan of IPOD was conducted in June 2015. The assessment was done based on the five capabilities. These were Capacity to: commit and act; deliver results; adapt and self-renew; attract and relate; and balance coherence and diversity. NIMD Uganda showed a relative balance in scores for each of the 5 capabilities. It was noted that the organisation was stronger in the capabilities on external relations. The assessment further revealed the need for clarity on the identity of the organisation and to develop a mechanism for internal learning.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens, including % of Latino and Afro barometer responds
Quantitative Data: 50% Qualitative description: There are generally low trust levels in the political processes in Uganda. The most recently available 2013-14 Afrobarometer measured public trust of respondents in the ruling party and in opposition parties separately. Combining these responses and collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is trust in political parties in Uganda. This trust is considerably lower in opposition parties (30%) than in the governing party (71%). According to other Afrobarometer data only 39 percent of Ugandans are “fairly satisfied” with the way democracy works in the country. In the interviews, political actors expressed that the ruling party and its leader have the ability to and often have exercised undue influence on political processes. The president, who is leader of the ruling party, appoints members the Election Management Body (EMB). Thus, several actors especially those on the opposition side consider the EMB as partisan. The leading opposition party has also repeatedly expressed mistrust in other organs of political arbitration including the courts. This was advanced as a key reason why they did not seek to challenge the results of the 2016 presidential election in the Supreme Court, as provided by the Constitution. Mistrust is also reflected in the very modest hopes for impactful political dialogue. A previous unsuccessful quest for political reforms which had been agreed upon between the ruling party and the opposition (with the support of civil society) breeds scepticism over the commitment to dialogue positions by the ruling party.
Political actors are more aware of and have internalised democratic values, rule of law and gender sensitive & inclusive politics.
% of political actors that reference the following topics in their manifesto/public statements, other publications - democratic values and/or rule of law and/or gender sensitive & inclusive politics
Quantitative data: 100 percent of political party manifestos include proposals for promoting democracy, rule of law and gender equality. Qualitative description: Political actors compete to demonstrate their commitment to democracy, rule of law and gender equality as reflected in their manifestos and policy documents. However, translating these policy pronouncements into action remains a challenge and raises questions on commitment.
NL-KVK-27189542-BUR16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Burundi programme 2016
BURUNDI’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Burundi has witnessed decades of violent civil conflict between ethnic groups. Despite the fact that a peace process has made democratic transition possible, strong political distrust and a lack of inclusive dialogue between different groups continue to pose significant challenges. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN BURUNDI NIMD started to work in Burundi in 2008. The implementing partner organization in Burundi is ‘The Burundi Leadership Training Programme (BLTP)’. In the run up to the 2010 elections, NIMD and BLTP worked on getting the political parties to talk to each other and develop themselves as democratic parties. However, since the 2010 elections – which many opposition parties boycotted – Burundi has experienced several years of serious political deadlock, including a period when the different parties would not meet each other and several opposition leaders lived in exile. In 2013 and 2014, as part of a strategy for unlocking this political deadlock, NIMD and BLTP managed to engage the main 13 political parties in an 18-month capacity building project. This was a series of training sessions on how to develop a political party programme, including topics such as how to write a programme, how to develop policy positions and how to involve members in the provinces in such a process. These were multiparty training sessions so representatives of all the main 13 political parties attended the programme together. So at the same time as providing training on very useful technical information and skills, it was also a significant move towards building trust between the parties. In addition to the different multiparty trainings, NIMD also facilitated the process of parties holding internal party discussions, including consulting with their members in several provinces, and helped them to translate these discussions into policy positions on key issues. 2014 saw the last 6 months of this project and the start of a second project focusing on helping the parties to prepare for participating in the elections in 2015. This consisted of training sessions on topics such as how to select candidates, how to observe elections, how to work within the new electoral legislative framework and how to develop communication strategies for getting messages across to the electorate. These activities were executed both in the capital as well as in provinces esteemed to be potentially risky during elections. NIMD and BLTP also arranged for the independent electoral commission to participate in some of these sessions to enable them to exchange information with the political parties and to increase trust in the management of the electoral process. Democracy Schools Since 2011, NIMD and BLTP have also been running democracy schools in Burundi. The school programme started in two provinces and was aimed at training community leaders in democratic knowledge and skills. Currently, there are schools in 8 provinces. We constantly work on furthering developing the set up of the schools and the curriculum. For instance, the training modules now also address security problems because that is an important issue in Burundi at the moment. This means that the schools are now also open to policemen.
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
Burundi Leadership Training Programme (BLTP)
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
USA State Department
Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs
UNDP Burundi
NL Embassy Burundi
659377
11668
45285
5550
46080
3237
Improved organisational capacity of political actors in fragile settings to effectively and legitimately participate in political (dialogue) processes.
In general, the difference between different parties’ organizational capacity is quite large. There is a stark difference between the governing party, which has a functional structure, and the opposition parties, that attempt to operate while facing persecution and sometimes exist only because of infighting in the parties they originated from. A characterization of the parties grouped by allegiance to either the government or the opposition is provided below, indicating the difference that the current landscape means: The ruling party (CNDD-FDD), is focused on consolidating its bases for the continuous mobilization of members around activities for security building and local development (local infrastructure, building party headquarters, etc.); Two parties which have been integrated into the institutions of the Republic (UPRONA, FNL Bigirimana) face a very uncertain future because despite their legal status and seats in parliament their political identity is questioned. These parties exist in their current form after a split has occurred and leaders of their parties still lead independent political groups (Agathon Rwasa for the FNL and Charles Niditije for UPRONA). It remains questionable to what extent these parties will be able to to reorganize and reconstruct their bases in anticipation of uncertain future elections. Nditije’s and Rwasa’s political group formed a joint list of independents and despite them formally boycotting the elections they won seats in the national assembly. Rwasa and its members decided to take their seats, despite their boycott. Rwasa became the 1st Vice President of the national assembly and several members of Rwasa’s group have been appointed as ministers in Cabinet. Despite Rwasa’s shown effective leadership control over much of the old FNL structures and popularity his group formally is not a political party and this therefore poses significant challenges for consolidation and sustaining his political organization. Still the choice of UPRONA, FNL and Group Rwasa to enter institutions opens up some space of freedom and action they are all trying to take advantage of to find, in their own way, their respective bases to revive them and even lay the foundation for expansion; For the opposition parties united against the third term of President Nkurunziza, which have boycotted the elections and did not win seats in the assembly the focus is on survival. They exist despite the risks and the security constraints exercised by the Government. The functioning of the bodies of these parties is affected by this constraint. The meetings still held have no agenda turned to reconstruction and redevelopment objectives. In light of this report, the actors of these parties residing in the country operate in semi-clandestine fashion. Their leaders are largely abroad in exile. A key group of leaders have formed an opposition alliance called CNARED. This alliance includes a group of former CNDD-FDD politicians who initially protested against Nkurunziza’s third term (les frondeurs) and have since established their own political party (PPD). For obvious reasons this group has no legal status in the country. Another opposition party that initially participated in CNARED but since has decided to take an independent stance is UPD. This party’s leadership also consist of a group of former CNDD-FDD politicians that were expelled from the party in an internal conflict in 2008.
# and % of political parties with increased scores on the political party capacity-assessment.
This data is the aggregated result of measurement of scores of all key political parties on three aspects of organizational strength: a. Existence and regular meetings of a national structure: 0,58 b. Electoral organization in different constituencies: 0,90 c. Political position on the dialogue process: 0,55 In the breakdown of these scores, it can be noted that while under aspect B parties scored higher in general, aspects A and C had lower scores. Especially under aspect A, a notable difference exists between the ruling party that has a functional structure, and key opposition parties that either operate in secrecy and therefore are significantly challenged in organizing regular party structure meetings, or where sometimes party life is almost non-existent. The indicator is operationalized by the percentage of parties with increased scores. Individual scores of parties, available in the table below need to be compared between measurements. In order to be able to identify developments for individual parties, individual party scores and aggregates are available below. As extra information, the total aggregated score of all parties can also be compared between measurements.
% of key political parties that are recognized to have a distinctive party profile within the party landscape
In the context of Burundi, this indicator is operationalized as political parties with a political programme written and publicly available before the elections. In part because of NIMD’s effort to support political parties in the development of a political programme, a large number of political parties developed a political programme in the course of NIMD’s trainings: out of 13 parties, 11 developed a programme. Only 11 of these 13 belonged to the key political parties at the time. Out of these 11, only 2 (CNDD and UPRONA) did not have a programme publicly available before the 2015 elections. However, most political parties did not use the programmes actively in the campaign running up to the 2015 elections. This is an important qualification, that needs to be monitored for the mid and end term measurements.
Higher recognition and approval ratings of political actors by citizens.
Recognition and approval ratings of political actors by citizens is on average quite low, just over 57%. However, political parties tend to be some of the least trusted and approved institutions. Looking at the data, a markable difference between approval and recognition (operationalized as trust in political actors) is visible between the government and the opposition party. While the government earns a high 72 percent, the opposition pulls down the average with 43 percent. In general, opposition parties are highly divided and weakly organized institutions. While the ruling party has acted oppressively over the last period, it is also in full control of the Burundian state. A qualification therefore can be that in the minds of citizens, the governing political party could be conflated with the institutions of the state.
% of respondent citizens that express trust in political actors
The Afrobarometer score on this topic from 2013/14 was used. The barometer distinguishes between trust in the ruling party and in the opposition party. For the quantitative data, the number of respondents who reply with “somewhat” or “a lot” are divided against the total respondents, and the scores for the ruling and opposition party are averaged. For the ruling party, the percentage of respondents who expressed trust is 72% For the opposition parties, the percentage of respondents who expressed trust is 43. The difference, although not taken into account in the quantitative data percentage, is notable. Another qualification is that this measurement was taken before the current political crisis, which may have affected trust levels in both ruling and opposition political parties.
Concrete proposals for an accepted and equitable political system proposed and accepted
In Burundi during the 2015 elections, around which the baseline was measured, the level of polarization between political actors is very high. The level of polarization was raised due to president Nkurunziza’s announcement to make himself electable for a third term. This decision has been claimed to be both unconstitutional, as well as against the provisions of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The current government, that took office in August 2015, is not recognized by the main opposition parties. Apart from that, opposition leaders have been persecuted and harassed, while unclaimed attacks on military bases have taken place outside of the capital Bujumbura. While various international mediation attempts have taken and are taking place, none of these seem to offer a solution to the current situation in the near future. Polarization therefore remains high, and scenarios of increased tension and violence cannot be ruled out.
% of political actors that participate in the next parliamentary elections
Qualitative description: Participation in the general elections of parties that registered at the recognized electoral management body was used as an outcome indicator to measure levels of polarization. After examination of the filed records by political parties, the official electoral body CENI couted registrations from ten political parties, three coalitions and three independent candidates. The selected political players, who are set in the list below, comprise 9 actors of the opposition 4 of the presidential group. This clarification is important as it helps explain why to be registered does not mean participate in elections. Actors of the opposition, who boycotted the elections, are tagged with (*). Only 4 political parties out of 16 took part in the elections. 9 political parties, coalitions and independent candidates had publicly announced they would not participate considering that the context was not conducive. Note: The chairman of the CENI claimed he never received the paper to officially announce the boycott of the opposition. Therefore he considered that the elections would be held as if all the lists were involved. Accusing him of being controlled by the government, the opposition questioned the legitimacy of the CENI. List of political parties / coalitions / independent candidates selected for Elections of Representatives N° parties / coalitions / independent candidates CONSTITUENCIES Out of 18 POLITICAL PARTIES 1 FNL 18 2 CNDD-FDD 18 3 MSD* 18 4 SAHWANYA FRODEBU NYAKURI* 18 5 UPRONA 18 6 MRC RURENZANGEMERO* 17 7 UPD ZIGAMIBANGA* 16 8 PSD DUSABIKANYE* 5 9 SANGWE PADER* 3 10 PALIPE AGAKIZA* 1 COALITIONS 1 ADC IKIBIRI* 18 2 COPA 18 3 RANAC* 17 INDEPENDANT CANDIDATES 1 ABIGENGA AMIZERO Y-ABARUNDI* 18 2 RDB* 1 3 RUFYIKIRI ISIDORE* 1
Shared agendas for steps towards peace and stability developed.
In spite of diplomatic efforts from the region and the international community, there is no prospect for a way out of the current crisis. The former president of Tanzania, Mkapa, has held two rounds of consultations in May and July 2016 and presented his progress report to the heads of state at the East African Community Summit in September. He stresses the large differences between the vision of the opposition and the ruling party, and the lack of willingness to participate in any meaningful dialogue. While the government has launched its own dialogue process, this is controlled by the ruling party and does not entail a shared agenda towards peace and stability. The EAC continues its support for Mkapa’s attempt and pressure on the government. New rounds of talks are expected in October.
# of political party leaders that sign national agendas for peace and stability.
This is an assembled indicator, that operates in two subsequent measurement steps. As a first step BLTP/NIMD determines whether a national agenda for peace and stability exists. The second step is to measure the percentage of key parties that sign this agenda. As there is still no national agenda for peace and stability, NIMD and BLTP will monitor the evolution of the internationally facilitated dialogue to see whether any agenda may result. For the time being the baseline is therefore 0%. We will therefore ensure the monitoring of the move towards that agenda for the mid-term and final evaluation.
Personal trust between rivals improved.
This outcome measures the level of trust between political rivals. The interventions carried out by BLTP/NIMD aim to improve this level of trust. At the moment, trust between different political parties is very low. This can be inferred from the high level of polarization between parties. At the same time, the personal trust between political rivals is also relatively low. This can be seen in light of the recent political crisis.
Score of trust in the political leadership of rival parties by different political parties.
This score is based on a measurement of trust based on a series of questions, which can be answered on a 1 to 5 scale (further explained in the methodology section). For all questions, a score closer to 1 indicates higher levels of trust, while a score closer to 5 indicates low trust. This measurement was done through a MOIT (Measurement of Interparty Trust)-test with focal points of all key political parties during two trainings on non-violent communication and negotiation skills and interparty dialogue in the framework of the project with the United States State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The test was conducted directly by BLTP’s programme responsible. The MOIT is based on a questionnaire, with all 22 questions. These questions are tested, validated, items used to assess both trust and the drivers of trust, on a common 5-point scale. In designing this questionnaire, the items have been mixed up, and they have been adjusted to suit the context. After the questionnaire, the answers have been re-ordered, so that averages for trust and drivers of trust can be calculated. An overall average has been calculated, to see how all interviewees score on average when it comes to inter-party trust. This overall score can be compared at mid and end term measurements
More equitable representation of all groups in society around the policy table
% of women, youth, and minorities that make up membership of the policy dialogue tables .
All parties have incorporated and reflected the role of youth and women in their constitutional and statutory texts and strive to make them digitally and adequately represented in their internal organs, and when they sit there, in the institutions. This is a matter of choice and a deliberate desire to promote youth and women for responsibilities which facilitate their perception and their conditions of equality with men. However, there are no or too little vision nor articulated positions on the employment challenges and the integration of youth and women.
The value was not available at the time of data collection.
# of political parties trained
# of political parties trained
# of students that have successfully completed the Democracy Schools
# of students that have successfully completed the Democracy Schools
# of participants in capacity-building activities
# of participants in capacity-building activities
NL-KVK-27189542-ZIM16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Zimbabwe Programme 2016
ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND The contested 2008 presidential elections led to an upsurge in political violence and a five-year period of power-sharing between the main political parties. Since the 2013 elections, relations between the former liberation movement ZANU-PF and opposition parties have remained polarized. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN ZIMBABWE The focus of NIMD’s programme in Zimbabwe is to try to build trust and dialogue between the parliamentary parties. It also looks at the political participation of women and young people. NIMD works in Zimbabwe together with strategic partner, DIPD (Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy), and implementing partner, Zimbabwe Institute.
Zimbabwe Institute (ZI)
Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD)
AWEPA
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD)
NIMD HQ
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
236600
22166
18635
30000
41500
Political actors understand the legislative process and have increased capacity to develop and formulate policy ideas into legislation
# of Private Member Bills/amendments moved and % adopted
Qualitative description: In analysing the Hansard over the last twelve months, there are no recorded Private Member Bills (PMBs) in this period. In corroborating with Veritas, there was also no information listed of PMBs moved in this period. The period was pushed back to January 2015 and there were still no listed PMBs. There were none adopted.
Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5-Capabilities scan)
Local implementing partner (ZI) increased their score on organization scan (adapted BART)
Quantitative data: Table 2: ZI BART Scores 31 May 2016 Capabilities Results Max C1 Commit and Act 3.5 5 C2 Deliver Results 3.3 5 C3 Adapt and Self Renew 2.9 5 C4 Attract and Relate 3.8 5 C5 Balance Coherence and Diversity 3.4 5 Qualitative description: ZI is relatively balanced in three of the five capabilities; however, discrepancies are to be found in the two capabilities at either end of the scale. These fluctuations indicate an organisation in transition and are in line with ZI's transition from a fairly large organisation under the JOMIC project, to a more modest one at present. The Ability to Adapt and Self-Renew, which at 2.9% is the lowest scoring - indicates that ZI is weakest in its internal capabilities. In particular, suggesting that ZI needs to put more focus on its communications policies in order to better establish its identity and mission in the public imagination. Moreover, it was noted that the organisation needs to develop an effective mechanism for internal learning - for staff advancement but also for documenting and learning from the lessons derived from its operations as an organisation. The financial health of the organisation was prioritized for improvement, with the indicator scoring 2. The Ability to Attract and Relate, at 3.8, was scored the highest. One of the biggest strengths of the organisation is the leadership (including the Board) of ZI, which was scored the highest under this capacity. ZI has also been successful in creating a vision and mission, and translating those into objectives and action. The “spider web” diagram below provides a more detailed picture of the overall scores on each of the key issues. The six highest (blue) and lowest (red) were highlighted in the diagram.
NL-KVK-27189542-GHA16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Ghana Programme 2016
GHANA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Ghana is generally seen as a development aid success story. In 2000 the first democratic transition of power took place after successful elections and in 2012 power changed hands again. In 2000 the NDC – the party of former dictator Jerry Rawlings – peacefully handed over power to another established party: the NPP. The NPP subsequently won but in 2012 lost again to the NDC. There are four parties in parliament. The NDC and the NPP are the largest. The parties, in comparison to other African countries, are quite established and ideological. Despite major improvements in education, food security and the economy, Ghana is currently facing serious economic challenges due to overpromising and underwhelming oil revenue and subsequent overspending as well as an energy crisis. At the same time, it is facing governance challenges related to the new activity of large scale commercial production of oil. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN GHANA NIMD’s programme in Ghana started in 2002 and the main focus has been on facilitating interparty dialogue. Political parties were extremely acrimonious towards each other. The attitude was: the winner takes all, if you lose power you lose everything. This blocked any serious political progress. Under the programme’s guidance political leaders met and debated publicly for the first time. This led to an interparty dialogue platform that includes the party leadership of all parliamentary parties. The platform is facilitated by NIMD and local implementing partner organization, the Institute of Economic Affairs. Currently, the platform mainly focuses on three areas: constitutional reform, electoral reform, and addressing excessive executive powers. The platform aims to move Ghana away from what they call ‘Winner takes all politics’ where whoever wins the election has all the power without enough checks and balances. Under the platform’s guidance a transition of power act was drafted and passed into law. This makes for a much better democratic transition. NIMD also supports the parliamentary parties to develop their policies. In Ghana we do this partly by funding a policy analyst post for each of the four parliamentary parties.
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
137460
7422
137.460
30000
68730
61882
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
% of political actors that experience an enabling environment in which they are involved in inclusive policy making
Level = 1 Quantitative data Number of youth leaders who have contributed to policy process The questionnaires provided the following quantitative data. 52% of the youth interviewed had contributed to a policy process before. Capacity in which youth leaders contributed to policy process 82% of those who had contributed to a policy process indicated that they had done so as part of a youth network or organization. 48% of this number said they had been invited to take part in the policy process by policy makers. Reflection of youth input in final policy For those who had contributed to a policy process, 8% thought their contributions to the policy process was well received. The remaining either had no idea whether their contributions had been received well, or thought the response had been discouraging. 18% of the number who had contributed to a policy process believed that their contribution had reflected in the final policy position. 82% thought it did not. 32% of the number that had contributed to a policy process before thought their contributions to the policy process had been effective. The remaining number thought their contribution had not been effective. Qualitative description The focus group discussion with youth leaders deepened the quantitative information gathered. The focus group discussion seemed to provide a higher degree of candidness than participants’ responses to the questionnaires provided. The following information emerged from the discussion: Characteristics of Youth Contribution to Policy Processes 1. High contribution of individual youth to policy processes In the estimation of youth leaders, individual youth had contributed to national development and policy making at the highest levels over the past three decades. Ghana’s military uprising in 1979 and eventual return to democratic governance was led by persons within the category of youth. The country’s second republic has seen several Ministers and Deputy Ministers of State within the youth bracket. There are many youth in the district assemblies. Parliament is seeing increasingly youthful membership. In the opinion of participants, “it is the youth who have taken us to the place and the state in which we are today”. The contribution of the youth in Ghana’s national development and in policy processes however remained at an individual level. As individuals, members of the youth were participating at the highest levels of national governance and policy development. However, they were perceived by the wider body of Ghanaian youth as playing those roles in their personal capacities, and not as representatives of a youth constituency to which they hold themselves accountable. The youth therefore perceive them as distanced from their reality. “The youth in government are too high and mighty…”.The youth in positions of government are further viewed by the youth as subservient to the policy positions and interests of the establishment. The contribution of the youth to national development and policy making is therefore characterized by individuals, who through personal effort and resources, have risen to positions in government. They are not viewed by the youth as representatives of the youth or accountable to them. 2. Insignificant contribution of formally educated youth to policy processes The contribution of formally educated youth (youth with secondary and tertiary education) in policy processes is considered largely insignificant. Youth of this category are active on social media, where vibrant discussions on policy issues are carried out. In the opinion of participants, their discussions have almost no effect on policy. They have minimal direct engagement with policy makers at national, district and local levels. Occasionally, some Ministers of State will respond to their discussions on social media, with posts and tweets buy direct engagement of this nature seems not to translate into policy action. Their need is for support to turn their contributions into collective influence with policy makers. 3. Ad hoc contribution of youth in local communities to policy processes Contribution of youth based in local communities to policy processes appears to be characterized by ad hoc spurts of vibrant mobilization and presentation of demands, which are taken seriously by their Assembly men/women and Members of Parliament, particularly as election periods draw close. Their contribution however remains at a very basic level of demands for physical infrastructure and facilities, and not analysis and input on policies that could address the fundamental challenges underlying their basic needs. The influence of the youth at this level derives from their voting power during election years. Assembly men and women, and Members of Parliament tend to take their demands seriously in order to secure their votes. There is a need is to educate them on the policy constraints underlying their needs and support them to demand policy changes/implementation to address those needs. 4. Constrained contribution of youth to political party policy-making processes Political parties indicate that they have mechanisms for youth input into party policy making processes. One party provides for the youth to make written statements where they wish to input into policy processes. Another party has provided its youth wing with the space to hold a Youth Congresses. The contribution of youth wings and their membership, to political party policy making processes, is however perceived by the youth as constrained and restrained. Youth wings perceive themselves as being restrained and held in check by political party leadership. They do not consider themselves free to express and act upon their opinions. A recent episode where the youth leader of a political party was reprimanded and disciplined for an enquiry he initiated into a party policy issue was cited as a reflection of the wider approach of political parties towards youth contribution to policy making processes. Number of Public Collective Statements by the Youth Key policy issues that directly affect their present and future wellbeing have been discussed without their collective input or reaction; as for example the protracted policy discussion on the number of years that high school should entail. “We have not been able to influence any policy in Ghana to reflect youth interest”. Effectiveness of Youth Contributions to Policy Processes Based upon the above characteristics of the youth’s participation in policy processes, the youth consider their contributions to policy processes in Ghana as ineffective. They identify the following causes for their ineffectiveness. Causes of Ineffective Youth Contributions to Policy Processes The youth identify the following root causes of their ineffective contributions to policy processes. These are listed in order of importance surfacing from the focus group discussion. i. Underlying fear of the youth: The youth hold the opinion that members of government and political party leadership alike have an underlying fear of the youth, based on a perception of them as radical and lacking in restraint. Government and political party leadership have a fear of recognizing the youth as equal partners in policy making. In their opinion, this has resulted in government and political party leadership employing subtle mechanisms to constrain the youth from reaching beyond certain limits in mobilizing and presenting a youth position. They perceive an underlying fear that youth wings could break away from their mother party if allowed the space for policy discourse and influence. The youth therefore consider themselves to be held in check and stifled from expressing and pushing their opinions forward. They are however of the opinion that radical behaviors are in themselves a symptom of suppression and marginalization. It is important, in their view, that the youth are recognized as a marginalized group. The way to dissipate radical, unrestrained behaviors on their part is to offer avenues for their opinions to be expressed and addressed. ii. Antagonism between the Youth and Political leadership: The result of the above phenomenon is an underlying sense of antagonism between the youth and the leadership in government and political parties. This also affects the ability for constructive policy dialogue to transpire between them. It is inferred from the above that political party leadership may not, at present, experience the input of the youth as constructive, underlain as it is by antagonism on the part of the youth and fear and suspicion on their part as leaders. iii. Political polarization and divisions in the youth front: A factor of equal importance as the one above is the absence of a united youth front. The youth consider their front to be divided along political party lines and loyalties. They are therefore unable to present a united front. The youth have been affected by what they perceive as a developing political culture where self-interest, rather than national interest, drives the motivation of political actors. The youth are therefore unable to form a united front at community levels, within tertiary youth organizations/networks and as youth wings of political parties. iv. Apathy in the youth: The majority of the youth are in school and unaware or disinterested in policy issues affecting them. Their focus is narrowly focused on their grades. The social and educational culture within which they are located also does not encourage the challenging of authority or interjections into “adult conversations”. v. Absence of spaces for youth participation in policy dialogue: The youth hold the opinion that the space for their participation in policy dialogue does not exist. While platforms exist in principle, in practice, they are inaccessible to the majority of the youth. vi. Low capacity for policy analysis: Low capacity for policy analysis also affects their effectiveness in policy processes, confining their input to very basic levels of infrastructure provision.
Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5 Core Capabilities of NIMD's scan)
Local implementing partners increased their scores on NIMD's organizational scan (BART), which is based on the 5 C model
Quantitative data Results Max C1 Commit and Act 4,1 5 C2 Deliver Results 4,3 5 C3 Adapt and Self-Renew 4,3 5 C4 Attract and Relate 4,6 5 C5 Balance coherence and diversity 4,5 5 Results Max C1 Strategic planning 3,5 5 Leadership 4,4 5 Healthy financial position 4,3 5 C2 Human resources 4,0 5 Infrastructure 4,1 5 Efficiency 4,4 5 Effectiveness 4,2 5 Relevance 4,8 5 C3 Understanding Contexts 4,1 5 Flexibility 4,3 5 Adequate PM&E 4,4 5 Encourage learning 4,1 5 Up-to-date communication 4,7 5 C4 Alliances 4,6 5 Legitimacy 4,9 5 Integrity 4,8 5 Accountability 4,2 5 C5 Strategically coherent 4,3 5 Consistency 4,7 5 Balanced Stability 4,9 5 Inclusiveness 4,0 5 Qualitative description The BART scan indicates that the implementing partner in Ghana has the following strengths: Balanced stability: The organisation has a well-established network among political leaders. They have the convening power to organise regular inter-party dialogue meetings that are attended by party chairmen and sec gens. Overall the organisation manages to find common ground between the parties, by successfully navigating the interests of both ruling and opposition political parties. Integrity: Board, leadership and staff of the organisation are accepted by all relevant stakeholders and are generally considered sufficiently impartial. Leadership and staff of the organisation are also considered to be sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled by all relevant stakeholders. The organisation promotes high standards of integrity for political parties. Legitimacy: The organisation is capable of attracting the appropriate level of party representatives to ensure meaningful participation in its inter-party dialogue programme. The organisation is recognised as a knowledgeable partner for building bridges between political parties and other relevant stakeholders like government agencies, democratic institutions and civil society. The organisation is registered under the proper government regulation, applies its statutes and obeys national legislation. Relevance: The organisation is recognised by key democratic institutions and civil society actors as capable to contribute to strengthening democratic culture and systems through its work. The results delivered by the organisation meet the needs of the political parties and other external target groups that are collected through regular needs assessments. It is difficult to identify weaknesses in such a high scoring scan, if anything the following two elements could be indicated: Encourage learning: Overall staff consider the allocation of time for careful review and learning on the basis of PME or exchanges with peer organisations on common challenges and lessons learned no more than adequate. Strategic planning: Key democratic institutions and civic organisations are aware of the strategic plan of the organisation. Even when removing the outliers this element scores on the level of ‘developing implementation’ this suggest room for improvement. Further, according to the staff the political parties as represented on the board are not well aware of the strategic plan and do not monitor its implementation as well as they could. Accountability: This sections seems to be among the lower scoring, however after further review there is a zero score placed as one staff member had no opinion on this issue, causing the overall score to drop. If this zero score is removed accountability is placed among the higher scores.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens, including % of Latino and Afro barometer responds
Quantitative data 41% Qualitative description The most recently available 2013-14 Afrobarometer measured public trust of respondents in the ruling party and in opposition parties separately. Combining these responses and collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is considerable trust in political parties in Ghana. This trust is somewhat higher in opposition parties (45%) than in the governing party (36%).
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
% of political actors who indicate that collaborate with other civic actors at least x times per year
% of political actors who indicate that they collaborate with civic actors at least 1 time per month
Quantitative data 8% of respondents indicated that there was interaction between political actors and youth leaders at least once a month. 60% of respondents indicated that there was interaction but on an ad hoc and infrequent basis. Qualitative description Frequency of Interaction with Policy makers There seems to be minimal to non-existent formal interaction between policy makers and civil society currently. Engagements of policy makers with the public are broad and not youth-centered. Policy makers therefore do not necessarily hear youth voices through these interactions. Although the youth are free to approach parliament with their input, they do not consider parliament accessible to them. Informal interaction between some Ministers of State and youth representatives transpires on social media. Much more regular interaction occurs at the community level between assembly men/women and youth. Youth in local communities participate actively in radio phone-in programs, where local authorities are called in to answer questions of importance to local people. The local authorities directly engage with the youth on these platforms. Youth in the northern parts of the country have a practice of gathering together in the evenings in what they refer to as the “ghetoses” and “base” to fraternize with each other. In these spaces, they regularly discuss community development issues, which will sometimes result in them calling on duty bearers and politicians to act on their concerns. These platforms have proven very effective in getting local authorities to act regarding the provision of services. These interactions are however ad hoc and unstructured. Action by political actors in response to youth demands is dependent on the influence of the said duty bearer or politician at the national level.
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
# of collective policy statements made publicly by political and civil society leaders
Quantitative data (0) No collective policy statements have been made together by political and civil society leaders (political leadership and youth leaders) Qualitative description As indicated earlier, the youth consider their front to be divided along political party lines and loyalties. They are therefore unable to present a united front. The youth have been affected by what they perceive as a developing political culture where self-interest, rather than national interest, drives the motivation of political actors. The youth are therefore unable to form a united front at community levels, within tertiary youth organizations/networks and as youth wings of political parties. 64% of the respondents said they had made some form of public statement representing the position of the youth, as against 36% who have not done so. The table below represents number of public statements they had made that represented the position of the youth. 36% said they had made up to 5 such public statements, 8% said they had made 6 to 10 public statements and 20% said they had made over 10 statements. Six respondents (24%) said they had made these statements as leaders/members of a youth organization; 2 respondents (8%) said they had made those statements as leaders of a youth network; 14 respondents (56%) did not respond to the question; and 3 respondents (12%) responded as other. In the focus group discussion, the youth indicated that they have not made any public policy statements that represent the collective position of identifiable sections of the youth as far as they can recall nor have they made any public statements together with other political actors. Public statements made by the youth have been limited to threats by irate youth at the community level, regarding issues such as political appointments and infrastructure in their communities.
NL-KVK-27189542-UKR16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Ukraine Programme 2016
In 2016 -2020 NIMD will launch a new intervention in Ukraine. In 2016 NIMD - through its Eastern European Neighbourhood office based in Tbilisi - will set first steps by establishing its presence in Kyiv, securing its network among stakeholders and donors, commissioning baseline studies, initiating preliminary capacity-building activities with receptive beneficiaries, and exploring other avenues of cooperation. In this way, NIMD is building on the yet existing capacity and valuable lessons learnt from working in Post-Soviet countries. NIMD will assess this piloting phase (January-December) by the end of 2016 and gain insights in the windows of opportunities in that rapidly changing political climate. On this basis, it will deploy a full-fledged multi-year intervention for 2017-2020 focused on inclusiveness for political processes and legitimate and responsive actors in Ukraine, for which the Dialogue for Stability instrument of Dutch MFA and other funding will be used.
NIMD Eastern European Neighbourhood
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
137082
87000
8500
66443
3606
23280
Existing safe spaces hosting a functional dialogue and/or cooperation platforms
In spite of the consolidation of some spaces for inter-party exchange (for example the Euro-Optimist platform), the mechanisms for dialogue and trust building continue to be established fundamentally on an inter-personal level. A well-oiled culture of transactional politics seems to be dominant, while a genuine culture of structured political dialogue and compromise is much more elusive. Here the multiplication of “ad-hoc dialogue spaces” and the influence exerted by international actors and domestic civil society, whereas helping to advance the agenda of legislative reforms, may pose additional challenges to the consolidation of a culture of political dialogue.
# of relevant issues discussed by political parties in an institutionalized dialogue setting
Key definitions: Relevant issue: Issues of national importance. The questionnaire focused almost exclusively in policy making at the national level. In particular around the key policy and institutional reforms, which have been taking shape in the country in the aftermath of the Dignity Revolution. Institutionalized dialogue setting: Regular multiparty dialogue meetings Political parties: The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level.
Qualitative description: Political party members were asked to identify which amongst the 12 most important reforms approved in the last 2 years had been discussed in multi-party fora. They were given the option to mark as many as they deemed necessary. They could also mark the box all of them or none of them. According to the results of the questionnaire and the interviews, all the 12 reforms were addressed in one form or another in a multi-party dialogue platform. Whereas elements of a well-oiled culture of transactional politics are easy to find, a culture of structured political dialogue and compromise is much more elusive in current Ukrainian politics. This is so for the following observable reasons: Firstly, the multiplication of “ad-hoc dialogue spaces” in recent times represents a significant challenge for the establishment and consolidation of true multi-party dialogue efforts, which can yield a much needed consensus around a broader agenda of reforms for the country: It disincentivizes political actors when it comes to the development of their own knowledge generation and knowledge management structures and serious sustainability challenges for dialogue efforts; It exacerbates dynamics of competition amongst potential “facilitators”, thus limiting the overall capacity of the system to generate the incentives for true consensus-building activities. It extends a rather limited understanding of what multi-party dialogue and consensus-building really entails. Thus, preventing the possibility for further development of a truly party-based dialogue platform on issues of relevance for the future development of the country. Secondly, whereas the ability of international actors and domestic civil society in bringing actors around the table to pass specific reforms remains one of the key drivers of change in current Ukrainian politics, it may be hindering the development of a more endogenous culture of compromise and political dialogue. Taking into consideration the extent of international pressure exerted in order to achieve some of the key reforms (particularly in the anti-corruption area), one can question the real weight that the process of inter-party and inter-faction dialogue played in all this. Score Number of relevant issues discussed 1 Functioning of mechanisms for individual cooperation and dialogue 1 Culture of compromise -1 Number of spaces for policy debate -1 Functioning of structures for inter-party dialogue -1 Total score for policy dialogue in institutionalized settings -1
Concrete proposals for an accepted and equitable political system proposed and accepted
% of political actors that experience an enabling environment in which they are involved in inclusive policy making
Enabling environment: Legal, political and cultural conditions that impact the capacity of political actors to influence policy Political actors: Political parties and cross-party caucuses. The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level. Inclusive policy-making: All parties are involved and participate in policy making at the national level. Even if the participants in the questionnaire and the interviews included parties, which main institutional roles unfold at the local level, the questionnaire focused almost exclusively in policy making at the national level. In particular around the key policy and institutional reforms, which have been taking shape in the country in the aftermath of the Dignity Revolution
Quantitative data: 0 None of the political actors currently experience an enabling environment in which they are involved in inclusive policy making; Average score for polarization is 3 in a 1-10 scale where 1 represents maximum level of polarization Qualitative description: Parties qualify the political environment as a competitive arena rather than one in which political and social actors are enabled to work together in order to address the country’s significant challenges. Similarly, most actors perceive a process of deterioration of the political environment as compared to the political situation in the immediate aftermath of the Dignity Revolution. The political process remains to a large extent driven by key personalities and the capacity of special interests to influence and accommodate the policy process to their own priorities. The dominant political culture continues to be one of short-termism, behind-the-closed-doors-deal-making and quid pro quo. A culture of compromise remains largely absent. Coalitions are not structured around clear party axes or ideological cleavages. The positions of individual politicians fluctuate across the whole range of options almost on an issue-by-issue basis so that party representatives who may adopt a progressive position on a certain policy area, may become, the staunchest defendants of the status quo on another. The resulting environment is one where the mechanisms for dialogue and trust building are established almost on a personal level, with political parties and party factions in parliament or the adscription to government or opposition camps playing a limited or no role at all in defining the policy positions. Nevertheless, as noted by our interviewees there are exceptions to the above-mentioned dynamics. These include: The Euro-Optimist group as a multiparty platform for advancing reform; The Inter-faction Union for Gender Equality; The ad-hoc (albeit limited) multiparty discussions taking place in the context of specific initiatives by the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR). The work carried out in the Parliamentary Committees. The spaces facilitated by the international community in order to support the process of adoption of specific legislation. Score Experience of an enabling environment -1 Polarization and perception of general evolution of the political environment -1 Functioning of mechanisms for individual cooperation and dialogue 1 Culture of compromise -1 Existence of spaces for inter-party dialogue 0 Total score for enabling environment -2
A more open and inclusive political system that contribute to stability
# of political actors that have introduced or reformed internal party regulations on the inclusion of women in decision-making bodies
Key definitions: Political actors: The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level. “Attitudes Towards Women’s Political Participation in Ukraine” National Democratic Institute - February 2016. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI%20Gender%20Research%20FEB%202016%20-%20ENG%20vf.pdf
Quantitative data: 0 0/8 - Parties do not have specific policies in place to facilitate women participation, beyond the compliance with the 30% gender quota recommendation established in the Law. Furthermore: For the last parliamentary elections, 2/8 (Samopomich and Batkivshchyna) adjusted its candidates lists to comply with the recommended threshold in legislation of at least 30% minimum gender quota. For the local elections 75% of the lists presented by all the parties in the country complied with the 30% quota Qualitative description: Women still face constraints in practicing their political, economic and social rights. Yet, political parties, across the political spectrum do not seem to consider gender equality a pressing issue or one in which they would think reform is necessary (whether at the statute or party policy level) or urgent. Low participation of women in party lists or party decision-making bodies is not particularly socially sanctioned, nor it seems to be specially rewarded by voters when more women are included. At the social level, there is not a very significant level of explicit opposition to women participation in politics (only around 13% of respondents to a recent survey). But just about 38% of the population would express their preference for equal participation of women and men in politics. The prevailing vision of the role of women in politics is constructed over an implicit dominant association of women with the private sphere and the perception/assumption of women’s lack of interest in politics, which would ultimately explain why they are less involved. Women MPs interviewed for this baseline study did not distance themselves greatly from this analysis, even though they were able to identify instances of sexism in their interaction with male MPs and gender based discrimination in some practices of political parties. Yet, generally, parties are not perceived by women politicians as blocking the entrance of women into the political sphere. This speaks volumes of how ingrained gender inequality is in the societal mainframe and also about the difficulties to move parties beyond the current status quo on this issue. As noted by many of the experts interviewed for this baseline study, one positive aspect, which may favor greater women participation in politics is the linkage established between parties’ access to public financing and the compliance with minimum gender quotas recommendations. This type of positive incentive seems to be slowly transforming the practice of parties. Score Perceptions of women in society -1 Policies developed to address gender imbalances -1 Compliance with 30% minimum gender quota 1 (partial compliance but positive impact) General role of party structures 0 Willingness of political parties to address gender imbalances -1 Total score for women participation -2
Higher recognition and approval ratings of political actors by citizens
Political parties continue to endure a bad reputation in Ukraine, with trust rates hitting a historical low score in 2015. Nevertheless, 70.2% Ukrainians consider political parties and important factor for the adequate functioning of a democratic regime in the country. Mistrust in political parties is rooted in the perception of the political parties as lobby structures for the interests of their leaders (37% of respondents) and their financial donors (58% of respondents); rather than as organizations defending and articulating both the policy views of their voters and the national interest (only 11% agreed that parties represent citizens’ interests).
% of respondent citizens that express trust in political actors
Quantitative data: 12% of Ukrainians reported to trust in political parties Furthermore: 79% of Ukrainian citizens do not trust political parties Qualitative description: Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, political parties continue to endure bad reputation in Ukraine, with trust rates hitting a historical low score in 2015. Nevertheless, 70.2% Ukrainians continue to consider political parties and important element for the adequate functioning of a democratic regime in the country. Mistrust in political parties is rooted in the perception of the political parties as lobby structures for the interests of their leaders (37% of respondents) and their financial donors (58% of respondents); rather than as organizations defending and articulating both the policy views of their voters and the national interest (only 11% agreed that parties represent citizens’ interests). 63% of Ukrainians believe that political parties do not follow democratic standards in their activities. Similarly, the parties’ failure to adhere to their programmes and a lack of effective communication with citizens are both named as factors contributing to the overwhelming mistrust to political parties among the public. Legislation reforming party financing (opening parties to receive public funds for the first time in history and enhancing the levels of accountability and transparency on the public and private funds and donations received by parties) has not translated yet in a change in the long established mistrust vis-à-vis political parties. 77% of Ukrainians would never consider supporting a political party financially. The majority of Ukrainians also seem to oppose the idea of parties receiving any public funding (only 15% supports this measure). Citizens also show their opposition to the parties receiving funds from oligarchs (only 14% in favor). Finally only one third of the population (31%) believes that parties should be financed directly by their supporters. There is an overwhelming demand for a new breed of political parties in the country (71% of respondents consider new political parties as the only hope for the country’s future). Yet, the field seems to remain quite evenly split between those who see general differences in the political parties emerging after Maidan (42%) and those who do not see any difference (35%). What is more, when it comes to trust levels pre and post-Maidan parties enjoy very similar levels of trust (12% for pre-Maidan vs 15% for post Maidan). Leadership renewal is a top priority for Ukrainian citizens (55% considers that the country needs new leaders). In this regard, all parties competing in the early Parliamentary elections in 2014 headhunted for liberal professionals and individuals with a track record in civil activism to show a renewed face. Yet, an important share of people included in the parties’ lists continue to be cadres from previously existing political structures, thus contributing to a extending perception of business as usual. Score Trust in political parties -1 Capacity to communicate, represent and articulate interests -1 General willingness to support to parties (financially) -1 Democratic standards and transparency in parties -1 Perception of the importance of political parties in democracy 1 Total score for perception of political parties -3 Secondary sources “Perception of Ukrainians on political parties and sources of their funding,” Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, November 2015, Available at: http://razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/2015_Partiyi_8_ENG-1.compressed.pdf
Improved capacity of political actors in fragile settings to effectively and legitimately participate in political (dialogue) process.
# of published political documents by political actors based on real inputs from a defined support base
Key definitions: Political documents: Manifestos, statutes, position papers, policy proposals etc. Real inputs from a defined support base: Known support base for a PP such as CSOs, NGO’s and public in general Political parties: The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level. “Perception of Ukrainians on political parties and sources of their funding,” Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, November 2015, Available at: http://razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/2015_Partiyi_8_ENG-1.compressed.pdf
Quantitative data: 3 In 3 cases (Batkivshchyna, Syda Lyudey and Democratic Alliance) party manifestos developed in consultation with other actors. None of the parties included in the study have published relevant sectorial policy documents, which have been developed in consultation with a support base. Qualitative description: The progressive loss of importance of the policy and ideological component has been a characteristic of Ukraine’s party system for a long time. In the aftermath of the 2014 elections, parties have continued to ignore the need to develop party programmes and policy documents. In addition, there has been a significant process of simplification and, to a higher degree, a unification of the content of the electoral programmes of all political parties. The result of this process is that between 59% and 74% of the population (depending on their adscription to various sociological groups) would not feel their interests represented by any of the political parties competing in the 2014 elections. Party ideology/vision rarely influences the public activity of politicians and MPs. Policy directives, when they exist, seem to be established as a combination of political opportunism and the vision of the political leader of the party/faction. This results in parties not developing specific units in charge of policy development, beyond the legal support department. Similarly, MPs also find it difficult to install capacity for policy analysis in their own offices due to the lack of economic resources available to hire supporting personnel. In this context, civil society and international experts (sponsored by international actors) have come to play a key role in providing policy expertise for the development of specific policy proposals and legislation. This is creating powerful disincentives for parties to engage in a more consistent approach to programmatic development, notably when it comes to the development of their own research and analysis sections/departments. New parties established after the last Parliamentary elections have shown a predisposition to look at some of these issues differently. According to the results of our interviews and the survey conducted for this baseline study, those parties seem to better understand and value the importance of having a clearer policy and ideological stance as a means to communicate with voters. Also, due to their origins in civil society, the integration of civil society expertise in the party structures is much more organic than in other parties. Score Capacity to differentiate themselves through their political manifestos 0 Number of sectorial policy documents produced -1 Structures within the parties/parliamentary factions in charge of policy development -1 Consultation processes with party’s base 0 Mechanisms for consultation with policy experts -1 Total score for development of policy positions -3
Personal trust between rivals improved.
Score of trust in the political leadership of rival parties by different political actors
Key definitions: Trust in political leadership of rival parties: Trust whether they will keep their word. Political actors: The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level. The activities of cross-party caucuses are also examined for this indicator.
Quantitative data: 2 The average score of trust in a scale between 0 (no trust) to 10 (total trust) is 2, which lies right in the middle of our scale for very limited trust (1-3); Please see methodology for specific considerations about the validity of this indicator. Qualitative description: To measure trust between the political leadership of other parties, we asked party representatives to define their trust levels to other political parties politicians in a scale of 0 to 10. This question was included also in the on-line questionnaire, where respondents could attribute specifics score to each political party (again between 0 and 10). Figures were distributed across five categories. The distribution was as follows: 0 = no trust at all; 1-3 = very limited trust; 4-6 = limited trust; 7-9 = trust; 10 = complete trust The results of this indicator are consistent with the levels of perceived political polarization and the overall characterization of the current political juncture as one dominated by competitive dynamics. This raises our confidence in the accuracy of this indicator in spite of the limitations in the process of data collection. As mentioned in previous indicators, trust seems to be generated on a personal level, through specific interactions in the fora enumerated in indicator S2.1. Many party representatives have highlighted the importance of the work in Parliamentary Committees, but also the interactions in the fora established by international organizations and civil society to discuss and address specific reforms. Score Total score for trust amongst parties -3 (See methodology for an explanation of the way in which scores have been adapted)
# of political parties trained
# of political parties trained
NL-KVK-27189542-GEO16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Georgia Programme 2016
Georgia Programme Since 2010, all of NIMD’s instruments are used equally in the Georgia programme: facilitating dialogue, strengthening the capacity of the parties and stimulating democratic behaviour. NIMD has supported politicians from different parties to work together by helping them to set up issues oriented multiparty dialogue platforms in Parliament, such as on gender or national minorities. NIMD helps the parties to build their capacity to function effectively by helping them to develop strategic plans and giving them training. NIMD also works on democracy education with democracy schools in 4 different regions, focusing particularly on developing the abilities of political parties, people working for civil society organizations, and local governments to lobby about issues that need addressing.
NIMD Eastern European Neighbourhood
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
OSCE
Netherlands Embassy in Tbilisi
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
214430
3299
45000
214430
75000
48133
61938
445
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
The nature of relations between political actors and civic actors remains problematic in Georgia. The civic actors are deemed to be fairly important by all political actors. At the same time, the proclivity of the incumbent to influence the agenda of the civic actors remains unchanged. The political actors that are in opposition are in general supportive of the civil society representatives. Still it seems that these attitudes may change if the political actor now in opposition takes power. At the very least, that is demonstrated by the contrasting attitudes that the former incumbent demonstrated towards the civic actors while in government and now in opposition. Some political actors, however, do view most important civic actors with suspicion and distrust. Still the civic actors are considered very important by all political forces.
# of political actors who indicate that they collaborate with other civic actors at least 5 times a year
Qualitative description: in the first half of 2016 8 political parties participated in at least 3 events that involved engagement with the civic actors. The records of these meetings were provided by NIMD office in Tbilisi.
A level playing field for all political actors and civic actors wanting to influence politics
# of structural changes opening up space for greater engagement by political and civic actors, including # of structural changes and new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors + # of laws and mechanisms ensuring safe engagement between political and civic actors
In the first half of the 2016, 3 new mechanisms of engagement between political and civic actors were implemented with the support of NIMD. The first mechanism engaged 8 political parties to formulate ethnic minority inclusion action plans. The second mechanism instituted an internship program for ethnic minority representatives within 5 political parties. The third mechanism instituted a dialogue between political parties and local civic actors using NIMD Schools of Democracy as a platform. In the framework of these initiatives a total of 27 events were organized by NIMD where 8 political parties met with various civic actors and discussed wide variety of key issues. The thematic content of the discussions ranged from ethnic minority inclusion to economic growth, unemployment, democratic development, poverty reduction, healthcare, and environmental issues among others.
A more conductive environment for inclusive participation of women( and political processes and policymaking includes the voice of women and minority groups, and gender equality agenda receives wider support in and out of parliament)
# of policies proposed by political parties that reflect national minority needs and interests
In 2016, 8 major political parties including the ruling party have agreed to foster ethnic minority participation in political life by creating action plans with the support of NIMD (1 for each party).
Political actors that voice and monitor citizens’ interests
Given the upcoming Parliamentary Elections on the 8th of October 2016, political actors have put some effort into addressing the concerns of the citizens. At the same time, their responses have largely remained too general and their political campaign was still focused on personalities rather than political programs; most of them have not yet presented electoral platforms, and so far, quite a few of them concentrated on issues that are at the very bottom of the public agenda. At the same time, it seems that the citizens have been paying closer attention to political manifestos than during the previous electoral campaigns. Still, according to the recent polls, the citizens remain very skeptical about political actors in general.
# of published documents (manifestos, election programs, position papers, policy proposals, etc.) developed on an inclusive basis
In August 2016, more than half of the 10 political parties that had won seats in previous local and/or parliamentary elections did not yet present electoral programs with elections less than two months away. However, they did produce a total of 30 political documents and video missives. From the total of these 30 available documents, 15 demonstrated inclusiveness regarding the youth issues and gender equality. Practically none of them addressed meaningfully ethnic minority issues.
Improved capacity of local partner
Local implementing partners increased their scores on NIMD's organizational scan (BART), which is based on the 5 C model
This score is an average of the scores on the 5 capabilities that are listed in the table below. In July and August 2016, an organizational scan based on the 5C model was conducted to assess NIMD EEN’s capacity. In an anonymous survey with 11 staff members, the implementing partner scored an average of 4,5 out of 5. With all capabilities being well above average, NIMD EEN is a capable partner to implement the programme effectively.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens, including % of Latino and Afro barometer responds
Quantitative data: 41,4 % To determine the level of trust in the political process we have chosen to examine public trust in Government, Political Parties, and Media as expressed by approval ratings in %. Additionally, we considered citizen trust in democratic development and in democracy as a form of government expressed in % of population positively assessing each indicator. In order to measure change, we have chosen to take the average (percentage) of the 5 indicators listed below. In 2016, the average score is 41,4%. Government – 32% Political Parties – 16% Media – 76% Democratic Development – 36% Democracy – 47% Qualitative description: We have used the results of the surveys and polls conducted by the well-established national and international organizations as well as the data provided by the Central Electoral Commission of Georgia. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) were chosen because of their long established credentials in the area and the high probability that they will be conducting the same or similar surveys in the coming years that will make the future assessment of developments possible. We arrived at Trust in Government score by averaging the combined score of public trust in executive, legislative, judicial and local branches of government. The scores for Media and political parties were readily available. As for the score for Democratic Development we averaged the citizen perception of improvement regarding the freedom of speech, human rights, rule of law, democratic governance and willingness to vote in the next election. The democracy score was based upon the public attitude towards democracy as the best form of government that was readily available from the survey we used.
NL-KVK-27189542-MMR16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Myanmar Programme 2016
MYANMAR’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Since 2011, Myanmar has gradually been returning to civilian rule, cumulating in historic nationwide elections held on November 8th, 2015, and the subsequent installation of new parliaments 3 months later. Over the past few years, a series of social and economic reforms were launched in Myanmar, opening up the country to the global community after a long period of isolation. At the same time, the country is still trying to end conflict with some of its numerous ethnic groups. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN MYANMAR Together with Demo Finland, NIMD started working in Myanmar in 2014. The programme in Myanmar has two key aims. The first is to help the politicians from all the political parties to enhance their knowledge and skills for working in a democracy. The second is to develop the practice of collaboration. The programme works on both of these aims by running the Myanmar School of Politics (MySoP), an intensive retreat lasting up to one month, held at a secluded location. During MySoP, politicians from different parties discuss and learn together in a multiparty setting. During 2014 and 2015, these schools have been held in Shan State, Mon State, and Tanintharyi Division, with Kayin State and Kayah State added in 2016. MySoP is followed by activities for its alumni. These activities provide an opportunity for the politicians to keep coming together to learn and practice interparty dialogue. Bram Steenhuisen is Demo Finland’s and NIMD’s Country Representative in Myanmar. In an interview with Demo Finland he gives an insight into the school’s activities.
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
Demo Finland
Demo Finland
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
333197
54500
10574
37500
333197
45834
45026
44019
45123
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens
The most recently available 2015 Asiabarometer measures public trust in institutions in Myanmar. A small portion of Myanmar citizens expressed a ‘great deal of trust’ in various political institutions, with a larger portion expressing the other positive category, ‘quite a lot of trust’. There was considerable variation in the trust of different institutions, with the executive, military, and NGOs receiving the highest trust, and police and courts the lowest level of trust across institutions. Cross-national comparisons of the trust in political institution showed Myanmar’s low trust levels in the executive, police, courts and military, while the low trust level of parliament was on par with other countries in the region. We choose the level of trust in parties as our baseline measurement, collapsing the categories “a great deal (7%)” and “quite a lot (36%)”.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Extent to which political actors state/regional level experience an enabling environment that includes them in policy making
Quantitative data: On a scale from 1 to 4, the baseline measurement score is 2: political actors hearing the concerns of constituency, but not able to change policies. The values related to different scores are the following: 1- political actors not hearing the concerns of constituency; 2- political actors hearing the concerns of constituency, but not able to change policies; 3- political actors hearing the concerns of constituency, with some ability to change policies; 4- political actors hearing the concerns of constituency and able to change policies. Qualitative description: In Myanmar, political actors at state/regional level seem to experience that their concerns are heard however they are not able to change policies within their parties. This is mostly related to the quite hierarchical and top-down structure of political parties in Myanmar and in Myanmar society at large. Policies, as far as they exist, are written at headquarters and political actors do not have a lot of influence in this process.
Political actors that voice and monitor citizen interests
# of published political documents (manifestos, election programmes, position papers, policy proposal) by political parties that indicate being based on inputs from their defined support base (potential voters)
Quantitative data: 4 (out of a total of 26 documents studied) Qualitative description: In Myanmar the number of political documents is rather limited, many parties do not have a manifesto or election programme. Furthermore some political documents are classified or their location is not made public. Some political parties do not have websites or sometimes their websites cease to exist, making it even harder to access information. For that reason we have felt pressured to accept the fact that we could only include a limited number of official political documents and extended the way to measure this indicator meaning also to include (a limited number of) Facebook and media statements. For this desk research 26 political documents have been collected from 15 political parties in Myanmar. The political documents included in the research are election manifesto’s, party’s policies, stance and work programmes that are public declaration of principles, aims, organizational attitudes and planned activities, these account for 54 percent. The other 46 percent of the studies documents are other political documents such as proclamations or directives. The collected information from different sources was used to check against whether the party made reference to the party’s engagement with its constituencies through a consultation moment in order to gain inputs for producing such political documents. Documents have been selected from these parties: Zomi Congress for Democracy, Democratic Party (Myanmar), National Unity Party, Union Solidarity and Development Party, Pa-O National Organization, Kachin State Democracy Party, Lisu National Development Party, Wa Democratic Party, Kayin People’s Party, Lahu National Development Party, Kokang Democracy and Unity Party, National League for Democracy, Mon National Party, Arakan National Party and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy. When studied, only 15 percent – 4 documents – of a total of 26 political documents suggest that they have inputs from particular constituencies through consultation moment for particular issues. These documents were issued by the Zomi Congress for Democracy, National Unity Party, Pa-O National Party and Kachin State Democracy Party. They all are in the category of election manifesto, policy, stance and work programmes. Obviously, the political documents issued by the political parties basically all show an interest in their constituencies. All the issues, sectors and social classes shown in the policy documents all address issues those common in any similar countries. The same is true of other political documents such as proclamations, directives and official requests that express public expectations and demands on their behalf. The rest of the collected political documents accounting for 75 percent – was made up of policy objectives, work plans and other forms of party’s statements. The 75 percent documents issued by both nationwide large/small Bama and ethnic based parties have a number of things in common: • The election manifesto declares a lot of issues to be addressed and a great number of sectors and social classes to be improved and social infrastructure to be developed. They include the promotion of democracy and human rights through constitutional amendment, establishment of federalism, improvement of legislative and judicial bodies and gender equality. Such sectors as agricultural, fishery, forestry, industrial, service provision, national defense and security, international relation, macroeconomic, investment and public administration are intended to improved, and also the document aims at narrowing the gap in socioeconomic conditions between urban and rural areas through the development of social infrastructure. In addition, the document focuses on the interests of workers and peasants through social welfare provision and the importance of preserving national characteristics. Even the USDP, military affiliated ruling party at that time, declares the amendment of the constitution and promotion of human rights. • The manifesto is general and vague. Despite the description of the issues to be addressed and things to be improved in its presented declaration, it lacks the discussion about how each issue has been brought to the party, how to achieve these goals, prioritization among them and timeframe. • When provided by some parties, the work plan along with policy ambition does not show how to achieve the particular aim, but more likely to be policy declaration again.
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
Myanmar political dynamics are characterized by polarization and mutual distrust caused by recent history as well as unfamiliarity with the concept of multiparty dialogue. The levels of trust and engagement between political and civic actors are equally low, and the ruling party exerts a high level of control over the political arena. In general there is a general lack of inclusive consultative mechanisms, both party members as well as people from all parts of society are excluded from influencing policies. Furthermore there is no clear linkage between parties and their MP’s, leaving parties out of influencing the decision making process. Unfortunately, it is not feasible to make general surveys among party members in Myanmar. There is strong sense of superstition towards international (democracy) support actors for trying to influence the Myanmar transition it is difficult for an organization to ask about these matters, this needs to be carefully prepared well beforehand. As we did not want to jeopardize our emerging reputation of a trustworthy and impartial organization by asking all kinds of ‘delicate’ questions to party members without having ample time to prepare them, we chose to interview those political party members who were participating in our programme and to whom we could explain why we were asking those questions. It is for that reason the sample size is not too large. However, we do hope to broaden the number of participant for the mid-term measurement after three years.
# of political actors(participants) who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors (including government actors) at least once a month
Less than 2 of the 17 participants of the Myanmar School of Politics-core course who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors (including government actors) at least once a month
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
# of political actors(participants) who indicate that they collaborate with civic actors at least once a month
only 4 of the 17 participants of the Myanmar School of Politics-core course) who indicate that they collaborate with civic actors at least once a month
NL-KVK-27189542-IND16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Indonesia Programme 2016
NDONESIA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND In 1999, Indonesia held its first democratic elections since 1955. Elections are popular in Indonesia. They are well managed by the Elections Commission (KPU) and have high levels of voter turnout. Indonesia has the second-largest one-day election in the world (after the USA) and since 1999 there has been a huge growth in the number of political parties contesting the elections, although the number of parties that actually meet the threshold for a seat in parliament is much lower. However, most political parties are based around the personality of their leader rather than having a programme of policies and there is widespread corruption. Governments are usually a coalition of many political parties and the politicians involved are usually more focused on gaining power than representing the people. Indonesia has a relatively young population. 43.3% of the population are younger than 24 and 85.6% are younger than 54. However, the political scene is populated by the same familiar faces which have dominated Indonesian politics for the past decades. They tend to still be representing powerful vested interests. There is a glimmer of hope, however. In 2014 a new president was elected who is a complete political outsider, a former governor of Jakarta who is known for his pragmatic reform-minded style. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN INDONESIA Until 2015, the core of NIMD’s programme in Indonesia was democracy education. By the end of 2014, the Democracy Schools had produced 1738 alumni in 8 regions. In the 2014 general elections, 179 Democracy School alumni ran for office and 16 were elected. 77 alumni were involved in the elections as officials. The alumni are organized in alumni organizations which engage in lobby & advocacy to address local issues like education, healthcare and pollution. In 2016, NIMD will be starting a new programme working with young politicians at the national level. Our aim is to equip young politicians with better political skills to fulfil their democratic role as elected representatives, as well as stimulating inclusive inter-party dialogue on democratic renewal. This programme will be implemented by Kemitraan – Partnership for Governance Reform.
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
190423
8653
37500
190423
48801
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
The enabling environment for lobby & advocacy is obstructed by the closed nature of the political system. The formal political system in Indonesia is largely dominated by political elites and vested interests. It is nearly impossible for outsiders to enter into politics without doing so in the context of one of the established political parties. In addition to this, parties must win at least 3.5% of the vote in order to be eligible for seats in the DPR. As a result, it is very difficult for new parties to get a foothold in the political system. The parties that are able to contest the national elections are dominated by strong leaders, often with business ties, and provide few opportunities for new leaders or ideas. In addition to this, state subsidies for political parties are insufficient. As a result, the parties are largely financed by wealthy businessmen, giving them serious political influence. Members of parliament are organised into eleven commissions whose role it is to draft laws of its own as well as approve government initiatives. It is not uncommon for members of political parties to work together in parliament if they have common interests, even political parties in opposing coalitions. Parliament has extensive powers to scrutinise and influence the policies of the executive government, but members of parliament are often unprepared for the task at hand and little training is available. Political parties, even those in opposition, thus potentially play an important role in terms of policy influencing and the generation of alternative policies that reflect the views of all groups in society. Civil society organisations (CSOs) also play an important role in connecting citizens with political actors. However, in recent years the ability of civil society organizations to effectively influence policy and engage in constructive political activity has been limited. This is partly due to the closed nature of the political system and the influence of business interests.
# of consensual law making processes
The youth (under 45) Parliamentary caucus has not started yet, hence the score of the baseline measurement is zero.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens
The most recently available 2012 AsiaBarometer measures public trust in institutions in Indonesia. We choose the level of trust in parties as our baseline measurement, collapsing the categories “a great deal” and “quite a lot”. (Source: Zhang-Xu Wang, Institutional Trust in East Asia, Paper for the 2013 Asia Barometer Conference on Democracy and Citizen Politics in East Asia”.)
Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5-Capabilities scan)
Local implementing partner (Kemitraan) increased their score on organization scan (adapted BART)
Quantitative data: Kemitraan’s BART Scores 11 April 2016 Capabilities Results Max C1 Commit and Act 3.9 5 C2 Deliver Results 4.0 5 C3 Adapt and Self-Renew 3.5 5 C4 Attract and Relate 4.1 5 C5 Balance coherence and diversity 3.7 5 Qualitative description: Kemitraan shows a relative balance in scores for each of the five capabilities. Such balance can be interpreted as a sign for a healthy organisation. The organisation seems to be strongest in the capabilities that are related to external capabilities, like “to attract and relate” and “to deliver results”. The organisation scores the weakest in the more internal capability “to adapt and self-renew”. Results of organisational scans of other organisations have shown that such slight imbalance of the capabilities is a sign of a transitioning organisation, one that is either expanding or contracting. Kemitraan staff in fact shared that the organisation over the past months of operation has been working on a decreasing number of projects, from 32 projects previously to 17 in 2016. The “spider web” diagram below provides a more detailed picture of where Kemitraan scores highest and where the organisation scores lowest.
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
There is generally a low level of civil-political consultation in Indonesia. There are exceptions: a number of large NGOs are consulted on a regular basis by government agencies. However, political parties tend to be less responsive to civil society. This is cause for concern in a representative democracy where political parties should be responsive to citizens’ needs and interests. Likewise, citizens have few avenues to directly voice their concerns and opinions except by voting in elections, which, as discussed above, has little impact when it is always the same familiar faces running for office. Furthermore, the other available avenue for interest aggregatoin from the support base in the post-election such as the recess has not been maximally utilized by the MPs. One specific constraint in this regard is the geographical distance between politicians in Jakarta and their constituents which are dispersed across the enormous archipelago that Indonesia is. Another is that there is an utter lack of trust in the political parties. The general public views political parties as corrupt and ineffective and civil society actors are hesitant to engage with them, afraid to be tainted by association with the political elites. The gap between political parties and civil society is undoubtedly one of the largest obstacles to the development of a democratic culture characterised by responsiveness and accountability.
% of political actors who indicate that collaborate with other political actors at least 2 times per month
This baseline indicator was measured on the basis of the definition of “collaborate” in the form of engaging with other political actors through consultation, implementation, in the form of meetings and/or joint action on social/economic/political/religious issues. It was also measured on the basis of how many times did this collaboration happen and how many times did something substantial come out it? From the interviews with 21 young members of parliament belonging to different parties, each one of them indicated that they had conducted at least 4 to 7 times of collaborative activities every month. Some of the interviewed members of parliament said that they conducted it in more than 10 times in a month. However, as already identified as possible limitation in the indicator reference sheets the risk for socially desirable answers is present. When asked in more detail it became clear that these monthly activities not necessarily resulted in concrete results. Only 1 to 2 substantial results came out from these monthly collaborative activities and the rest in some cases led lead to the formulation of follow up recommendations or proposals that would be presented to relevant stakeholders or in the parliamentary processes such as the plennary sessions and commission meetings.
NL-KVK-27189542-COL16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Colombia Programme 2016
COLOMBIA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND In 2014, Colombia went through two electoral contests. In March, a new Parliament was elected (using the gender quota of 30% for the first time), and in July, after a second round, Juan Manuel Santos was re-elected as President. These events produced a polarized political landscape. On the one hand, new political parties (like the Democratic Centre, led by former President Uribe) refused negotiations with the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). On the other hand, Santos achieved his second presidential term based on the campaign promise of reaching a final peace agreement with the FARC-EP before the end of 2018. At present, peace talks between the government and the FARC-EP are still going on in Havana. The ‘basic agreements’ of these talks are public. One of the agenda points on which the two parties have already reached consensus is political participation. This means that political inclusivity will be an important aspect of the peace process. It is expected that the negotiations will come to a successful conclusion in the near future. Democratic institutions It has become clear in recent years that Colombia needs to reform its democratic institutions to make them more inclusive and political parties more representative and disciplined. This becomes even more urgent in the face of a possible peace agreement with the FARC-EP. Therefore, the national government presented a proposal for political reform in September 2014, including issues such as congressional closed lists, the elimination of presidential re-election, implementation of the ‘zippered list’ and compulsory voting. However, the vast majority of these reforms were not adopted by Congress in 2015. Also, local elections will take place in 2015, during which more than 2,000 government officials such as mayors, governors, councilors and deputies will be elected. This situation poses a challenge to the political parties, both in terms of representation as well as candidate selection. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN COLOMBIA In 2015, NIMD’s activities in Colombia will focus on three programmes: The UNDP-NIMD-IDEA Respect for Women Political Rights programme (WPR Programme), the NIMD-Cordaid Programme for Democratic Dialogue for Environmental Security (PDDES), and a new initiative together with the Colombian government that focuses on the political participation of the youth. Through the WPR Programme NIMD will continue to support the women branches of all political parties in Colombia in order to strengthen their political skills and remove barriers to increase their participation. The PDDES programme brings together civil society actors and political parties around the democratization of environmental governance. The programme is implemented together with Cordaid and is being carried out in Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador. The third project, which is jointly executed with the Ministry of Interior in Colombia, aims to develop a strategy that combines technical, administrative and financial efforts to stimulate the political participation of young people. In addition to these programmes NIMD also offers direct bilateral support to the political parties in areas such as the capacity building of think tanks, candidate selection and the improvement of communication with civil society. This is one of the reasons why NIMD has opened a local office in Colombia in 2014. STRENGTHENING WOMEN IN POLITICAL PARTIES IN COLOMBIA In Colombia, violence against women has increased considerably in recent years. According to the newspaper El Tiempo, every six hours a Colombian woman is abused due to the armed conflict in the country, and a daily average of 245 women are victims of some type of violence. While there has been very little documentation of the violence used to impede women’s participation in politics in Colombia, violence against female leaders of social movements is common. Since 2011 UNDP, NIMD and International IDEA have worked with women and political parties in Colombia via the Democratic Strengthening programme. At the individual level, this work has included supporting the nomination of candidates, the promotion of women in legislative benches and commissions, and the creation of meeting spaces for elected women and social organizations. More than 1500 women took part in these activities. The political parties received technical support to assess and reform their internal rules and regulations.
NIMD Colombia
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
UNDP Colombia
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
554365
35000
75000
26458
16881
10000
8674
6554
38720
Higher recognition an approval ratings of political actors by citizens
% of LatinoBarometer respondents expressing trust in political parties
The most recently available 2015 LatinoBarometer measured public trust of respondents in political parties overall. Collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is very low trust in political parties in Colombia.
Improved capacity of political actors in fragile settings to effectively and legitimately participate in political (dialogue) processes.
Average capacity index score of political parties’ capabilities and responsiveness to the general public
A self-assessment survey was conducted among 9 political parties and contained 28 questions which addressed different subjects such as representivity, strategic planning, training, coordination, decision-making, communication and transparency. The collected data shows that parties assess themselves with an average of 81% out of a maximum of 100%. Particular weaknesses in political parties were identified in the strategic planning (61%) and training (76%) categories which produced the lowest results. It is worth noticing that almost all political parties have a positive perception regarding their accountability but this is rather a consequence of legal regulation, and not of the voluntary choice of the parties. In fact, most of them comply only with the minimums established by law.
Enhanced democratic values of political actors
Political parties in Colombia face high expectations regarding the implementation of the political participation part of the peace agreement, however, there is little awareness and knowledge on conflict resolution tools and other instruments to peacefully resolve conflict and process social demands. The information collected shows that political parties are still weak in the implementation of democratic values as evidenced in the limited existence of horizontal coordination mechanisms, communication channels with local levels as well as the lack of consultation with their members and supporters. Additionally, the training and knowledge sharing actions that could mitigate this weakness appear as the lowest valued category in the perception indicator. In contrast, the sense of trust and mutual understanding between political actors is perceived as relatively positive; an important attribute needed to contribute to the stability of the peace building process.
%/extent to which democratic values are perceived to be present in political encounters between political parties
In the focus group discussion, political parties were asked how they perceived the democratic values of their encounters with other parties. They ranked the existence of democratic values with an average percentage of 68 (derived from different questions about this topic). The collected data also showed willingness from the political parties to collaborate with new political parties/movements and to make alliances around common interests, as has been seen with coalitions made around the peace agreement plebiscite.
% of alumni of democracy schools that incorporate the contents of the training in their daily life
The first edition of the Democracy School has recently started, so there are no alumni yet who can incorporate the training in their daily life. Yet, this indicator will, over the years, give valuable information about the development of the quality of the democracy schools, and thus about its impact.
More equitable representation of all groups in society around the policy table
# of political parties that create or strengthen spaces for the participation of minorities
Quantitative data: 69% average in survey Qualitative description In the survey conducted with political parties, they indicated the extent to which spaces for the participation of youth, women, indigenous people, afro-Colombians and LGBTI people are created or strengthened within their parties. Those responses averaged to a total of 69%. Often, these are general spaces for all marginalized groups. A few political parties annotated that they didn’t have any initiatives for the strengthening of these spaces in the last year due the peace process agenda and budget constraints.
A more open and inclusive political system that contributes to stability
Colombia has a closed political system, with limited options for the emergence of political alternatives and an absence of regulations for the exercise of political opposition. However, due to the peace process there is a window of opportunity for political stakeholders to make changes in order to implement what was agreed upon under the “political participation” part of the accord. The legislative changes that need to be made constitute an important opportunity for NIMD to promote the aperture of the political system. The President submitted a constitutional reform act to Congress that establishes a simplified process to approve the legal reforms required to implement the Peace Agreement that has been signed with the FARC. In spite of the opportunity to make significant changes to Colombia’s political system, a strong polarization has characterized the current political scenario. The Government coalition and a large part of civil society promote the ratification of the peace agreements, in contrast to the Centro Democratico political party that has several unresolved issues with the agreement. The data collected shows evidence of a good level of attendance during NIMD events, and political stakeholders mention the importance of the support of NIMD.
# of policies supported by NIMD that make the political system more open and inclusive
Baseline data is 0, project started in January 2016 and can only be measured once the year 2016 results are obtained.
# of policies jointly formulated and submitted to Parliament and Government by the ruling and opposition parties taking part in the dialogue platforms
# of policies jointly formulated and submitted to Parliament and Government by the ruling and opposition parties taking part in the dialogue platforms
# of women and youth who participate in capacity building trainings
# of women and youth who participate in capacity building trainings
# of multistakeholder dialogues organized where agendas for peace and stability are discussed
# of multistakeholder dialogues organized where agendas for peace and stability are discussed
# of multi-actor meetings held about the changes needed for the improvement of the electoral system and the functioning of political parties
# of multi-actor meetings held about the changes needed for the improvement of the electoral system and the functioning of political parties
# of political parties trained
# of political parties trained
# of participants in capacity-building activities
# of participants in capacity-building activities
# of workshops or events organized or supported by NIMD to strengthen political parties’ capabilities
# of workshops or events organized or supported by NIMD to strengthen political parties’ capabilities
# of students that have successfully completed the Democracy Schools
# of students that have successfully completed the Democracy Schools
# of initiatives supported by NIMD to promote inclusion in politics
# of initiatives supported by NIMD to promote inclusion in politics
NL-KVK-27189542-DFS16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Dialogue for Stability (DfS) 2016
Dialogue for Stability: Inclusive politics in fragile settings (2016-2020) The number of countries and regions that are affected by conflict and fragility is globally on the increase. In Central America, a number of countries are hard hit by fragility and criminality; in the Horn of Africa and parts of sub-Saharan and West Africa instability and internal conflict continue to persist and in the MENA region, a number of countries are at risk of collapsing as a result of religious and political sectarianism. Also in the Eastern European neighborhood, high levels of tension and the use of force remain very worrisome. These conflicts are not limited to national borders. Increasingly, international dimensions are at play as the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine painfully reveal. The increasing instability at the eastern and southern borders of Europe also has an immediate effect on Europe’s own security and stability levels, as the current migration flows clearly unfolds. These developments require a fundamental rethink of the strategies and responses by the international community, informed by an in-depth understanding of the underlying root causes of the conflicts and fragility dimensions in these countries. To better understand and define its own role and positioning in the changing world order, NIMD recently embarked on a reflection process as part of the preparations for its multi-annual plan for the period 2016-2020. This resulted in the publication of its new Multi-Annual Plan entitled (MAP): ‘Stronger Parties. Deeper Democracy’. The MAP describes the vision, objectives, challenges and priorities for the period 2016–2020 and is underpinned by an elaborated Theory of Change. Its overall vision is “to contribute to legitimate and inclusive political systems which create favourable conditions for peace and security by accommodating divergent views and interests in society and by setting differences in a non-violent way”. Since NIMD is increasingly working in political environments which are extremely polarised and divided and in countries that moved either just out of conflict, find themselves in conflict or are at risk of moving towards conflict, NIMD has furthermore prepared an approach for working in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In line with NIMD’s Theory of Change, this approach focusses on three interrelated levels related to political system, political actor and political culture change. Over the past few months, NIMD has engaged in consultations with the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explore the possibilities for the Ministry to continue its support the NIMD beyond the current subsidy that comes to an end in December 2015. The outcome of these deliberations has resulted in the approval of a first grant under the Strategic Partnership for lobby and advocacy and the invitation to submit a five year programme to contribute to inclusive politics in fragile settings and for NIMD institutionally, on knowledge and innovation, monitoring and evaluation and fundraising. This programme called ”Dialogue for Stability: inclusive politics in fragile settings”, particularly aims to contribute to open and accessible political systems and the legitimacy and responsiveness of political actors in countries affected by conflict and fragility. The programme therefore directly contributes to the vision and objectives laid down in NIMD’s MAP and the goals on inclusive political processes and legitimate and capable governments as defined in the policy spearhead on Security and the Rule of Law of the MFA. Furthermore, it contribute to the aim of peaceful and inclusive sustainable development and accountable and inclusive institutions as defined in the 16th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) recently adopted. NIMD will concentrate its efforts on a selected number of countries (Burundi, South Sudan, Ukraine, Tunisia and Colombia) where it can build on its existing political and partner networks, knowledge base and infrastructure. These country programmes will be based on a country specific baseline and theory of change, informed by an in depth political economy analysis. Furthermore, explorations and a limited number of activities will be conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Kurdistan and Israel-Palestinian territories. Depending on the political environments and potential entry points in these three countries and one region, they could overtime evolve into fully fledged programmes. Next to these country programmes, the Dialogue for Stability programme will further deepen NIMD’s knowledge base, invest in its skills-set and develop tools and instruments regarding interparty dialogue, capacity strengthening, political culture and gender diversity and inclusiveness. A specific part of NIMD’s knowledge agenda will be devoted to strategies, skills and expertise for working in fragile and conflict affected settings in recognition of the fact that working in such sensitive contexts requires a tailored approach. Furthermore, NIMD will strengthen its knowledge base on new thinking about participatory democracy and stimulate and explore (programmatic and political) innovation in its new and existing programme countries.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIMD
NIMD
NIMD
+31 70 311 5464
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
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Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
El Salvador Programme 2016
EL SALVADOR’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND El Salvador is located in the northern part of Central America, and is part of the so called Northern Triangle together with Honduras and Guatemala. The three countries face a lot of similar challenges especially in the area of security. Socio economic situation Although the economy has steadily increased over the last decade in El Salvador, a large proportion of the population continues to live in poverty and the level of unemployment remains high. Young people and women are even more vulnerable to the socio economic situation. Furthermore, the country experiences some of the highest crime levels of the world. On top of that, climate change poses a serious challenge for El Salvador, because it is particularly vulnerable to extreme climatic events such as hurricanes, floods and droughts. As a result, tensions around sufficient clean water supply have built up. The country is dependent on Guatemala and Honduras for its water supply. Democratic system Over the last decades, the democratic system of El Salvador has been dominated by two parties : the conservative right-wing party ‘Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)’ and the ‘Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)’, which transitioned from a guerrilla movement to a leftist political party. After an initial domination of the political landscape by the ARENA party from 1989 until 2009, in 2009 the FMLN managed to win the elections for the first time and subsequently installed the first left-wing government in El Salvador. In February 2014, the FMLN won the elections again with a very narrow margin. In March 2015, elections took place for the Legislative Assembly, the Central American Parliament and the municipal governments. For the first time in history Salvadorans chose plural or multi-party municipal councils (before that the ‘winner takes all’ system was applied). These elections also had another new feature: for the first time a quota regulation of 30% for women was applied for the electoral lists. Despite a high perception of corruption and friction between the judiciary on the one hand and the presidency and legislative assembly on the other, the democratic institutions are perceived to be functioning reasonably well. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN EL SALVADOR NIMD’s work in El Salvador started at the end of 2012. As a result, the programme was focused on preparing the political parties for the changes in the electoral system for the 2015 elections. In light of the changes in the electoral law for the municipal elections, NIMD developed a ‘train the trainers programme’ for all political parties on dialogue skills and consensus building: important skills to have to ensure governability at local level. NIMD did this in coordination with other organizations. Inclusion of underrepresented groups In its work, NIMD pays special attention to the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics. The establishment of the quota regulations was an important step forward in Guatemala and resulted in over 30% of women elected in the Legislative Assembly. NIMD supports capacity building of women politicians through an intensive training course for women politicians from all political parties and from national and local level. Furthermore, NIMD seeks to contribute to a democratic culture where the rights of women and men are respected. We do this by investigating the barriers that hamper political participation of women and by exchanging best practices on gender sensitive policy and legislation. Capacity building of youth Young people tend to shy away from a career in politics, not seeing the possibilities that the political arena offers to positively influence important decisions about the future of the country. NIMD is in the process of establishing a Democracy School for young people from political and civil society to prepare them for their careers. At this school they will be able to practice democratic skills and behaviours and learn how to speak, listen and debate with mutual respect and focus on programmatic content. Environmental Dialogue NIMD also facilitates dialogue between civil society and political actors on issues related to environmental governance and security, such as water management. This approach is part of our Democratic Dialogue for Environmental Security programme. The programme is implemented together with Cordaid and is being carried out in El Salvador, Colombia and Guatemala.
NIMD El Salvador
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
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Safe (and institutionalized) space for dialogue between all relevant political (and civic) actors
# of structural changes and new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors
Quantitative data: There are 4 new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors. Qualitative description: From the research undertaken, the 4 new mechanisms identified are: 1. A Multiparty and civil society youth dialogue platform functioning in El Salvador as result from the youth training course developed by the NIMD in 2015. Youth from four out of five political parties represented in the National Parliament are represented in this platform: ARENA, GANA, PDC and PCN, and there are two civil society youth platforms represented: National Youth Assembly (ANJ) and the Intersectoral Coordinator Pro Youth of El Salvador (CIPJES). The platform’s main goal is to coordinate, plan and execute actions and/or joint strategies to promote the strengthening of youth structures within the political parties and youth civic platforms and to provide training and support the political decision making process towards youth. It is currently defining its mode of operation and its work program. 2. A National Committee for the Implementation of Resolution 1325 from United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security. This mechanism was created in 2014 by Executive Decree No.74. It is an interministerial and multi-actor working group to make policies and rule proposals entitled to ensure compliance with R1325 and its subsequent resolutions. The National Committee is composed by three main structures: a Board of Directors, a Technical Monitoring Committee and the Standing Advisory Group. The Board of Directors is made up of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Ministry of National Defense; Attorney General's Office (FGR), Public Prosecutor’s Office (PGR), National Institute for Women Development (ISDEMU) and 3 non-governmental organizations, including Prudencia Ayala Feminist Coalition. Currently the National Action Plan is being developed with NIMD and UN Women support. 3. Management Group for the Multiparty City Councils (CMP by its Spanish name). It is currently composed of the Under Secretary of Governance, the National Development Foundation (FUNDE), the Central American University Jose Simeon Cañas (UCA), Social Initiative for Democracy (ISD), the Foundation for Local Development and Municipal Strengthening of Central American and Caribbean (FUNDEMUCA) and the NIMD. Its goal is to coordinate actions for the effective implementation of multiparty city councils that exist since 2015 as a result of a change in legislation. Currently an assessment of the CMP’s first year of implementation is being developed. 4. Electoral Evaluation Workshop. First held in 2015 by the Electoral Supreme Court, with the participation of political parties’ representatives, civil society organizations, government agencies and universities. It was supported by NIMD and other organizations such as the OAS, A-WEB and International IDEA. They were organized in 11 working groups for two days. The objective is to organize an evaluation seminar after each electoral event.
Political actors that voice and monitor citizen interests
# of published political documents (manifestos, election programmes, position papers, policy proposal) by political actors based on inputs from a defined support base.
Quantitative data: There are 4 published political documents. Qualitative data: From the research undertaken, the 4 published political documents identified are: 1. A draft treaty on transboundary waters between Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador (policy proposal). ACTOR: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This policy proposal has been prepared by Salvadoran environmental organizations led by CEICOM, who are working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other political actors such as the Environment and Climate Change Commission, Salvadoran Deputies from the Central America Parliament, and other political and civil actors from Guatemala and Honduras. 2. A General Water Law proposal is under review at the Environment and Climate Change Legislative Commission. There are 3 proposals as input for the study: One has been made by the Water Forum (environmental NGO’s network), one submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) and one by the Association of Irrigators from Atiocoyo (representing the private enterprise interests). 3. Women Parliamentary Group has agreed a Consensus Agenda for the 2015-2018 Legislature, and it has been built including inputs received from different actors, such as: ISDEMU, women's organizations, Attorney General's Office (FGR), UN Women and UNDP. The Agendas’ validation process was supported by NIMD. 4. Memory built for the 2015 Electoral Evaluation Workshop, which includes the main findings and recommendations proposed during that process. All of these published political documents have been supported by NIMD.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
% of LatinoBarometer respondents expressing trust in political parties
The most recently available 2015 LatinoBarometer measured public trust of respondents in political parties overall. Collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is very low trust in political parties in El Salvador.
Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5-Capabilities scan)
In El Salvador NIMD operates a small country office since 2013. The office is currently represented by a staff of three people, composed of the country director, a programme manager and an administrative official. This team is supported by a political analyst with elaborate experience and a broad network of contacts in El Salvador´s political society. The country office works closely together with a number of other organizations and institutions, both national and international. During 2014 and 2015 NIMD has worked to build relationships with all political parties, especially those represented in the Parliamentary Assembly. It has also fostered relationships with other key stakeholders related to the areas of work of the Institute. Among them may be mentioned: 1. State institutions: Legislative Assembly, especially the Commissions of Environment and Natural Resources and of Women and Children, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Institute for the Development of Women (ISDEMU), Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (INJUVE), Association of Municipalities of the Republic of El Salvador (COMURES), National Institute of Municipal Development (ISDEM), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2. Non-Governmental Organisations: ASRPODE, Water Forum, El Salvador Environmental Alliance, GAIA, CEICOM, CEPRODE, ISD, FUNDE, FUSADES FEPADE and FUNDEMUCA. 3. Academic institutions: UCA, Universidad de El Salvador (UES) and Evangelical University of El Salvador. 4. Development cooperation entities: EU, AECID, USAID, GIZ, Canadian Embassy, Embassy of Chile, Embassy of Mexico, UNDP and UN Women. 5. Regional Entities: SICA y PARLACEN. Due to the diminishing attention for Central America, it is hard for the NIMD office to obtain additional funding. NIMD has established relations with the main donors and will continue to pursue additional funding opportunities. The SP budget is small, and that means that the activities are quite limited in scale as an important part of the budget is spent on operational costs.
Improved capability of local partners (based on adapted 5 Core Capabilities of NIMD´s scan)
Quantitative Data: 4.1 (5C average) Capabilities Results Max C1 Commit and Act 4,3 5 C2 Deliver Results 3,9 5 C3 Adapt and Self Renew 4,1 5 C4 Attract and Relate 4,2 5 C5 Balance Coherence and Diversity 4,2 5 Qualitative Description: The office is well established and managed in a short period of time to estaliblish a good reputation with the political parties and national and international organizations. Currently the office is in the process of getting its national registration. This registration will broaden fund raising possibilities. The office is small. That means that it can easily adapt to changed circumstances and it is flexible in its way of working and responding to emerging needs. At the same time the size of the office is also vulnerability. Much depends on the ED and with the limited amount of staff it is hard to attend a surge in activities which for example happened after the office got additional financing from the Canadian Embassy. One of the measures that have been taken is to establish a network of experts and consultants that can be called upon. However, this means depending on external factors, the office itself has only limited possibilities to reorganize its work. The budget does not allow for elaborated human resources policies. Security of staff, information and the office is important. It was not easy to find an appropriate office in San Salvador. There has been an attempt of theft and as a result additional safety measures have been taken.
Improved capability to attract and relate of political actors
# of active alliances between political actors and/or between political actors and CS stakeholders
Quantitative Data: 1 active alliance has been identified during the measurement period Qualitative Data: From the research undertaken 1 active alliance has been identified: 1. Alliance between political actors has been established regarding the electoral and political reform, specifically for the effective implementation of Multiparty Municipal Councils in 10 municipalities included in the “El Salvador Safety Plan” elaborated by El Salvador´s Government. The members of this alliance are: the Under Secretary of Governance, ISDEM, COMURES and 10 municipalities prioritized in that referred Plan. This alliance is being supported by UNDP, AECID-FUNDEMUCA and NIMD. Their main goal is to provide technical assistance and training to municipalities for the proper functioning of the local government working together with the opposition parties within the councils with emphasis on policy dialogue and consensus negotiation skills.
NL-KVK-27189542-GUA16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Guatemala Programme 2016
GUATEMALA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Guatemala is part of an area of Central America that is characterized by inequality. Even though it is a low middle income country, there are still a lot of people who live in poverty. This, together with very high crime rates and high levels of impunity is causing a lot of (young) people to emigrate. A large part of the population is indigenous and these people are particularly affected by a lack of employment opportunities and access to social services such as healthcare and education. These are issues that need to be addressed by politicians. However, political parties in Guatemala tend to be based on the personalities of their leaders rather than on a programme of policies. There is a high level of corruption and a lack of transparency. Politicians frequently move from one party to another and many political parties have short life spans. Guatemala is also affected by the increasing cost of electoral campaigns, which makes it difficult for people without access to large amounts of money to participate in national politics. At the same time there is a growing popular demand for change and a growing consensus to fight against corruption and change the political system. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN GUATEMALA Facilitating multiparty dialogue NIMD’s work in Guatemala started in 2002. NIMD’s first major project was facilitating multiparty dialogue, together with UNDP, between all the political parties over an 18-month period which resulted in the signing of a development plan for the country called the ‘shared national agenda.’ This was a plan for recovery following the armed conflict, which had continued in Guatemala for 36 years. Since that first project, NIMD has continued to facilitate interparty dialogue around themes of shared concern including political party reform, security, environmental governance and the inclusion in politics of underrepresented groups (such as women, young people and indigenous people.) In addition, NIMD has been working with Congress on facilitating interparty dialogue, especially on political party and electoral law, the rules and regulations of Congress and civil servant law. As a result of this work several changes have been made and other changes are pending. NIMD has also provided advice and training to Congress, including a training programme for Members of Parliament and their assistants, with the aim of increasing the quality of legislation drafting. Furthermore, NIMD works with several thematic commissions of Congress, making sure that demands and concerns of civil society organizations are known by the commissions and included in their legislative proposals. As well as working with Congress and political parties at a national level, NIMD has also been running democracy schools for young people, with special attention for the inclusion of women and indigenous people, in order to give more people the knowledge and skills to play a role in political decision-making. Political system reform In 2015, Guatemala faced a major political crisis, which led to the stepping down of the President, the Vice President, and several other high-level politicians who were accused of corruption. More transparency in political decision making was just one of the demands of the people who demonstrated. The newly elected Members of Congress, sworn in on 14 January 2016, responded to these public demands by reforming the Rules and Regulations of Congress. These changes include barriers for floor crossing (changing political parties and taking your seats with you), regulations that fight nepotism, and a reduction in the number of staff working in Congress. These reforms were made possible due to the consistent work of the Technical Commission of Congress, which was supported by NIMD in preparing and debating the different reform proposals. For more information, read this document (in Spanish). Raising gender issues on the national agenda in Guatemala Violence against women is one of the big problems Guatemala is facing. NIMD has contributed to a law against femicide by facilitating discussions between the different political parties and between civil and political society to enable a consensus to be reached on the content of the proposed legislation that was later adopted by Congress. The conservative ‘macho’ culture in Guatemala does not allow much space for women’s political participation. NIMD’s programme in Guatemala supports the Forum of Political Parties (FPP), a multiparty dialogue platform. Specifically, we have made resources available for the activities of the Commission on Full Citizenship for Women, or Women’s Commission, which aims to advance women in politics and leadership, independent of partisan ideologies. Women’s civil society organizations in Guatemala have long been pushing for a special law to punish the killing of women, or femicide. Guatemala has the highest femicide rate in Latin America: between 2000 and 2012 over 5000 women were murdered. With the support of NIMD’s political analysis and technical support, the Women’s Commission worked with civil society and women’s groups in the drafting of a law against femicide. After a long and intense dialogue process, the law was approved in 2008. It contributed to sensitizing Guatemala’s political culture to this important gender issue. Environmental dialogue NIMD also seeks to encourage a continuous and inclusive dialogue about environmental policy formulation. Additionally we aim to strengthen the capacity of women and other stakeholders to prevent and resolve conflicts related to environmental threats. This programme is implemented together with Cordaid and is being carried out in Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
NIMD Guatemala
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
198000
25000
6345
20000
198000
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A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
The 2015 demonstrations in Guatemala against corruption and impunity also called for political reform. Responding to these demands, the Congress initiated a series of consultations with civil society amongst others on reform of the Political Party and Electoral System. These consultation processes included the traditional, well established civil society organizations, but also the more loose network type organizations that came into existence in the summer of 2015. In September 2015 elections took place. This led to an outsider becoming president, whose political proposals and priorities were not yet clearly defined. The president does not have a majority in Congress. During the first half of 2016, the president of Congress, member of an opposition party, continued the legislative debate on the reform proposals demanded by civil society. Mistrust in politicians and the political system is high. People perceive politicians to be corrupt and thinking about their own well-being rather than that of the country. After the elections the public demonstrations diminished greatly. However, the population continues to be alert and is willing to voice their discontent if a new corruption scandal or political mismanagement arises. In this context, there have been several spaces for dialogue and discussion between civil and political society (especially Congress) on electoral reform and on Constitutional Reform of Security and Justice provisions. In these spaces, civil society organizations specialized in the issues have presented concrete proposals, given the importance of political reforms to change the system. Meanwhile, the Executive has invited civil society organizations and think tanks to develop proposals on issues that were not included in the last electoral reform, such as gender parity and ethnicity, internal democracy and models of representation.
# of inclusive law making processes with active CS consultation
Quantitative Data Between 2012 - 2015, 6 processes for law initiatives existed in which civil society was consulted about the issues relevant for NIMD’s Central American program 2016 – 2020 that are political reforms, fiscal reform, climate change, and water management. Political Reform (4) - The Electoral and Political Parties Law was discussed in 2 consultation mechanisms established by the Congress of the Republic: Legislative Working groups and the working group convened by the Electoral Supreme Court. - The Organic Law of the Legislative Branch was developed through a series of seminars with CSO consultation. - The Civil Service Law was discussed by the working group consisting of civil society and political representatives convened by the Congress of the Republic. Fiscal Reform (1) The civil society consultation on fiscal reform was organized by the Commission on Finance and Currency. A variety of think tanks, foundations, and especially business associations participated in the seminars. Climate Change (1) The Commission on Climate Change organized a series of public hearings to identify gaps in current policy and legislation and to identify legal amendments and policy measures to strengthen the system to deal with the effects of climate change. Water Management (0) Qualitative data: Between 2012 - 2015, 6 processes for law initiatives existed in which civil society was consulted about political reforms, fiscal reform, climate change, and water management 1. The Electoral and Political Parties Law [Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos – LEPP]: Guatemala witnessed a year of political turmoil in 2015. The president and vice-president were accused of corruption and resigned after massive demonstrations by a wide variety of Guatemalan society. One of the demands of the demonstrators was the reform of the political system in order to combat corruption. As a result both the Congress and the Electoral Tribunal organized a dialogue with civil society on the reform of the political party law (4974). Civil society provided substantial input during these two consultation processes and their comments were incorporated into the reform proposals. 2. The Legislative Internal Regime Law [Ley de Régimen Interior del Legislativo – LOOL]: during the same period, fifteen (15) initiatives were presented in Congress on reform o fthe LOOL. These were analyzed by the Technical Support Commission supported by NIMD, but after that the process did not receive any attention from the MPs. Social pressure and the demands of civil society organizations for a more transparent and efficient Congress forced the new legislature to take up some of the recommendations and make changes to its internal regulations improve its legitimacy. 3. The Civil Service Law: from 2012 - 2015 only two (2) initiatives were submitted; one with a favorable opinion scheduled in the agenda and the other created in the framework of the workgroups that Congress established in 2015 in the midst of the political crisis. Congress received the input of almost 50 civil society organizations, including Trade Unions. However, there was no follow up of the process to ensure the initiative would become law. The new Congress has not included this issue in the legislative agenda as it was not one of the main demands of the 2015 "La Plaza" demonstrators. Furthermore, the issue of Civil Service Legislation is sensitive as there are several key actors and therefore diverse interests to be dealt with. 4. Water and environment: In Guatemala there is no Law on Comprehensive Water Management, this being a key issue to the country's development and environmental conservation. The interests at stake are high, given the economic model of the country. In this sense the issue of water management was almost nonexistent in the past 4 years, since there was not even a single law initiative submitted. 5. Regarding climate change, one law initiative was submitted and heard before the Plenary, but there was no opinion issued by the related commission. The Environment and Natural Resources and the Climate Change Commissions organized roundtables with environmental organizations to come up with proposals to amend the Forest Law. The lobby from civil organizations managed to include incentives for forest communities organizations and Municipalities in the new legislation. The following organizations participated: UtzChe, Association of Forest Communities of Petén [Asociación de Comunidades Forestales de Peten – ACOFOP], CALMECAC Foundation, Foundation for Eco-development and Conservation [Fundación para el Ecodesarrollo y Conservación – FUNDAECO], Environmental and Human Resources Organizations Association [Asociación de Organizaciones Ambientalistas y de Recursos Humanos], National Association of NGO’s of Natural Resources and Environment [Asociación Nacional de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de Recursos Naturales y Medio Ambiente – ASOREMA]. 6. Tax reform was absent in the legislative agenda 2012-2015. The new president came up in August 2016 with a proposal for tax reform and that put the issue back on the agenda of Congress and of the civil society organizations. A bill of particular relevance in the Guatemalan context in light of the corruption scandals is the institutional strengthening of the Superintendency of Tax Administration [Superintendencia de AdministraciónTributaria – SAT]..
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens, including % of Latino and Afro barometer responds
The most recently available 2015 LatinoBarometer measured public trust of respondents in political parties overall. Collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is very low trust in political parties in Guatemala.
Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5 Core Capabilities of NIMD's scan)
NIMD Guatemala was established in 2003. The office grew in size until 2013, while after that a reorganization process led to the reduction of staff. The office in Guatemala supported the setting up of country offices in Honduras and El Salvador and provided input for those programs. A new director is heading the office as of may 2015 continuing the process of strengthening internal communication and coordination. The country office works closely together with a number of other organizations and institutions, both national and international. During the first 10 years of working in Guatemala, NIMD focused on the strengthening of political parties, multi-party dialogue and political system reform. Nevertheless, in the last couple of years, given the “new” citizens' demands and the weakening of the political system, we identified the need for accompaniment and training in lobby and advocacy of civil society organizations and citizens collectives. Based on its broad political network and expertise, NIMD facilitates and supports dialogue tables between those civil society organizations and political actors. Working with civic and political actors, NIMD pays special attention to gender mainstreaming and the inclusion of those groups that are discriminated and that lack effective representation in the political system. During 2015 NIMD has worked with political parties represented in Congress, CSO´s and other key stakeholders related to the mandate of the Institute. Among them may be mentioned: 6. Legislative power: within Congress, NIMD works specifically with the Commissions of Electoral Reform, Climate Change, Hydric Resources, Youth, Women, Technical Support, Legislation and Constitutional Issues, Human Rights. 7. State organizations: Ministries of Environment and Natural Resources, Culture and Sports, and Energy and Mining; The General Planning Secretariat; The Public Management Institute; The Supreme Electoral Tribunal; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8. Non-Governmental Organizations: CONAREP, MOLOJ, CONVERGENCIA CIVICO POLITO DE MUJERES, ASOCIACION POLITICA LA CUERDA, FUNDAJU/ASODEJU, JUSTICIA YA!, UUGT, ICEFI, FUNDACION ESQUIPULAS, FUNDAECO, CALAS, CONGECOOP, CECODE, COLECTIVO RIO, FUNDACION PROPAZ, 9. Academic institutions: “Rafael Landivar” University, ASIES, FLACSO, School of Political Science - USAC. 10. Development cooperation entities: Sweden Embassy, Norway Embassy, México Embassy, IRI, NDI, KAS, FES, USAID, UNDP and UN Women. 11. Regional Entities: PARLACEN.
Local implementing partners increased their scores on NIMD's organizational scan (BART), which is based on the 5 C model
In this section an analysis of the Organizational Performance Scan of NIMD on each of its components is presented. The average rate for NIMD-Guatemala was 3.68 based on the self- assessment of staff. C1. Commit and Act: The transition between the PP2 and the SP program affected the organization due to the lack of a clear strategy. Furthermore, NIMD decided to finalize its programme with the Multiparty Forum of Political Parties that it had been supporting since its establishment in 2003. These developments and the decline in financial resources required the office to make important adjustments. C2. Deliver Results: There is a gap between administrative and program staff when it comes to the appropriation of the strategic objectives of the SP. Due to the change in strategy and limitations of financial resources, the presence of NIMD has decreased, mostly in the bilateral relations with political parties and outside the capital city. C3. Adapt and Self-Renew: NIMD is less present in social media than it issued to be. It is necessary to improve the communication about the programs and results of NIMD Guatemala, so public opinion, beneficiaries and donors are aware of the activities undertaken and the results achieved. Additional attention for communication on financial processes is important for headquarters and other donors. It is also important to establish and adequate process of Monitoring & Evaluation which is essential to monitor the programme implementation and to assess if the goals are being met. This is also important for NIMD as a learning organization. C4. Attract and Relate: NIMD has the versatility and ability to cooperate with other agencies, such as NDI, UN Women, Konrad Adenauer in order to create greater impact. On the other hand NIMD maintains the legitimacy of being a neutral partner to politicians and civil society organizations. A weakness is noticed in terms of attracting donors for long-term processes on strengthening democracy. C5. Balance Coherence and Diversity: NIMD is a coherent organization with the values of impartiality, inclusiveness, diversity, local ownership and long term commitment, which is noted by its partners in civil society and political parties.
Improved capability to attract and relate of political actors
Guatemala has a system of dispersed political parties that are hardly institutionalized. The ability of political actors to negotiate and/or bring together different agendas does not revolve around a programmatic vision, but depends on interests and privileges of groups and actors involved in the issue. In this context, and given the absence of a government plan, the Congress has taken the initiative during 2015/2016 to define and further a political agenda for the country. The issues that are included in the agenda are determined by the following factors: the popular demands that were voiced during the La Plaza demonstrations; the CICIG-MP-US Embassy agenda (fight against corruption and security and justice); the interests of the traditional economic power. While UNE and FCN are the biggest parties in Congress, their interests are divergent. Political alliances with the smaller parties were established to determine the legislative agenda and its (partial) implementation. Multi-actor alliances were also established, including Congress, Social Organization and State Institutions. This allowed for progress on specific legislative and policy issues.
# of active alliances between political actors and/or between political actors and CS stakeholders
Unit of measurement 2 active partnerships (on relevant issues for NIMD) among political stakeholders and/or among political and CSO stakeholders: Among political stakeholders 0 Among Political stakeholders and CSO 1. 1. Security and Justice workgroup. This is an initiative from the Congress Commission on Legislation and Constitutional Issues to promote the agenda of Justice, Security and Human Rights together with Civil Society. 2. National Workgroup on Climate Change. This mechanism is institutionalized through the National Climate Change Law and consists of representatives of Government, civil society and think tanks. Qualitative Data The Workgroup for Security and Justice [Mesa de Seguridad y Justicia] is integrated by the MPs, civil society, the Office of the Human Rights Solicitor, Public Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of the Interior, the Judicial Branch, Criminal Public Defense [Instituto de la Defensa Pública Penal], UNICEF, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. During 2012-2015, the Workgroup prioritized the following topics: Reforms to the Judicial Career, Reforms to the Organic Law of the Public Prosecutor's Office, Reforms to the Civil Service Act of the Judicial Branch, age limit for marriage and Public Order Act. The National Workgroup of Climate Change [Mesa Nacional de Cambio Climático – MNCC] emerges when the State adopts a Law on National Climate Change. As a result of this law, the National Workgroup is established consisting of civil society organizations, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, the National Woods Institute, the Ministry of Economy, the General Planning Secretariat and the Ministry of Finances. Congressmen from the Commission on Climate Change are observers in this workgroup.
Safe (and institutionalized) space for dialogue between all relevant political (and civic) actors
# of structural changes opening up space for greater engagement by political and civic actors, including # of structural changes and new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors + # of laws and mechanisms ensuring safe engagement between political and civic actors;
Number of structural changes and new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors
3 new consultation mechanisms (Technical dialogue workgroups) with civil society were established in light of the 2015 events related to the Political Party and Electoral framework: 1. The initiative presented by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to the Congress of the Republic with the participation and technical assistance of civil society organizations devoted to the subject. 2. The workgroup convened by the Congress of the Republic, where 168 civil society organizations participated. 3. The platform for State Reform, convened by the University of San Carlos of Guatemala, that became a multi-sectorial civil instance. Qualitative description: 1. The political party reform initiative presented by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to the Congress was made in consultation with civil society. Different CSO were heard representing a variety of views on electoral reform. 2. After the 2015 demonstrations, the Congress convened a workgroup on political and electoral reform. 168 civil society organizations participated and the workgroup gathered input on the following themes: 1) Political financing and access to media; 2) Organization and internal democratization of political parties; 3) Strengthening the Supreme Electoral Court; 4) Electoral Process, null vote vinculante (binding); 5) Sanctions regime; 6) Electoral system. 3. The University of San Carlos is heading a multiactor platform for State Reform. The platform includes universities, professional associations, research centers, churches, indigenous peoples, trade organizations, organized private sector, cooperations, student organizations, unions, women, youth, farmers, NGOs, environmental organizations, social forums and human rights organizations. Its main purpose is to reach agreements and present proposals regarding a comprehensive process of State Reform. Their recommendations were taken into account by the workgroup on Political and Electoral Reform of the Supreme Electoral Court
Political actors are more aware of and have internalised democratic values, rule of law and gender sensitive & inclusive politics.
Many studies have demonstrated that Guatemala lacks a democratic political culture, where the citizens are actively involved in political, social or community organizations and feel they can influence public decision making. Machismo and discrimination are manifest in Guatemalan society and become clear in power structures and relations. Furthermore, political parties, social organizations and citizens very often show these negative values in their way of treating other people but also in the way they organize their organization and take decisions.
% of political actors that reference the following topics in their manifesto/public statements, other publications - democratic values and/or rule of law and/or gender sensitive & inclusive politics
Quantitative data: 63% of political and CSO's stakeholders who in the monitoring period made reference to democratic values, rule of law and/or gender & inclusive politics, in their public statements and manifestos. 94% of politicians and civil society leaders believe that the rule of law is a sine qua non requirement for democracy strengthening. 56% of the interviewed people are sensitive to inclusive models for youth, women and indigenous peoples. Qualitative data: The study was carried out from July 12 to 27, 2016. Two instruments were applied: A survey conducted to the 5% of participants of the Democracy School and a Focus Group that addressed in depth the conclusions derived from the survey. The following variables were used: democratic values, the rule of law, and inclusion. These reveal qualitative information on how the person values and perceives the democratic situation in the country. From this perspective, the qualification on the democratic situation in Guatemala showed that 44% perceives that is regular, while 6% thinks that is good. However, 25% stated that it was bad and another 25% very bad. In the end it shows a pessimistic environment about the quality of democracy in the country. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the study evidences patterns of thought and analysis that have been, if not acquired, definitely strengthened, by the training programmes of the Democracy Schools.
NL-KVK-27189542-HON16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Honduras Programme 2016
EL SALVADOR’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND El Salvador is located in the northern part of Central America, and is part of the so called Northern Triangle together with Honduras and Guatemala. The three countries face a lot of similar challenges especially in the area of security. Socio economic situation Although the economy has steadily increased over the last decade in El Salvador, a large proportion of the population continues to live in poverty and the level of unemployment remains high. Young people and women are even more vulnerable to the socio economic situation. Furthermore, the country experiences some of the highest crime levels of the world. On top of that, climate change poses a serious challenge for El Salvador, because it is particularly vulnerable to extreme climatic events such as hurricanes, floods and droughts. As a result, tensions around sufficient clean water supply have built up. The country is dependent on Guatemala and Honduras for its water supply. Democratic system Over the last decades, the democratic system of El Salvador has been dominated by two parties : the conservative right-wing party ‘Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)’ and the ‘Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)’, which transitioned from a guerrilla movement to a leftist political party. After an initial domination of the political landscape by the ARENA party from 1989 until 2009, in 2009 the FMLN managed to win the elections for the first time and subsequently installed the first left-wing government in El Salvador. In February 2014, the FMLN won the elections again with a very narrow margin. In March 2015, elections took place for the Legislative Assembly, the Central American Parliament and the municipal governments. For the first time in history Salvadorans chose plural or multi-party municipal councils (before that the ‘winner takes all’ system was applied). These elections also had another new feature: for the first time a quota regulation of 30% for women was applied for the electoral lists. Despite a high perception of corruption and friction between the judiciary on the one hand and the presidency and legislative assembly on the other, the democratic institutions are perceived to be functioning reasonably well. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN EL SALVADOR NIMD’s work in El Salvador started at the end of 2012. As a result, the programme was focused on preparing the political parties for the changes in the electoral system for the 2015 elections. In light of the changes in the electoral law for the municipal elections, NIMD developed a ‘train the trainers programme’ for all political parties on dialogue skills and consensus building: important skills to have to ensure governability at local level. NIMD did this in coordination with other organizations. Inclusion of underrepresented groups In its work, NIMD pays special attention to the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics. The establishment of the quota regulations was an important step forward in Guatemala and resulted in over 30% of women elected in the Legislative Assembly. NIMD supports capacity building of women politicians through an intensive training course for women politicians from all political parties and from national and local level. Furthermore, NIMD seeks to contribute to a democratic culture where the rights of women and men are respected. We do this by investigating the barriers that hamper political participation of women and by exchanging best practices on gender sensitive policy and legislation. Capacity building of youth Young people tend to shy away from a career in politics, not seeing the possibilities that the political arena offers to positively influence important decisions about the future of the country. NIMD is in the process of establishing a Democracy School for young people from political and civil society to prepare them for their careers. At this school they will be able to practice democratic skills and behaviours and learn how to speak, listen and debate with mutual respect and focus on programmatic content. Environmental Dialogue NIMD also facilitates dialogue between civil society and political actors on issues related to environmental governance and security, such as water management. This approach is part of our Democratic Dialogue for Environmental Security programme. The programme is implemented together with Cordaid and is being carried out in El Salvador, Colombia and Guatemala.
NIMD Honduras
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
NIMD HQ
Canadian Embassy in Honduras
NIMD
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
145000
2293
20000
145000
20000
21440
24000
27990
30126
Political actors are more aware of and have internalised democratic values, rule of law and gender sensitive & inclusive politics.
In Honduras, according to long-term researches of democratic political culture (LAPOP 2014), most of the population reveal attitudes of high or low support to the system and low support to some democratic values (such as tolerance to other people´s political ideas), which characterizes the country as one between authoritarian stability with tendency to democracy in risk (LAPOP 2014). Political analysts and key informants consider that there is also an important deficit of compliance to some of the basic elements of the democratic culture and its inherent values -rule of law, accountability, check-and-balances, tolerance, inclusion, participation…- among political actors (e.g.: political parties and its members). The recent sociopolitical history of the country, is proof of this: a coup d´etat in 2009, frequent bizarre decisions from Parliament and Supreme Court, tendency to models of authoritarian rule, corruption scandals and a high level of corruption perception (TI), social inequity, and low Human Development Index (UNDP) increasing levels of political discrimination or violence -including gender motivated. To understand how political actors do internalize democratic values (such as the ones mentioned above), a small survey of 36 participants was applied in July 2016 to young members of the main Honduran political parties (5) in the main city of the country (Tegucigalpa) to ask their opinions and perception about some democratic institution, democratic values and dialogue skills. Young politicians usually offer a good sample of the attitudes and beliefs prevailing within Honduran politics: most of them became part of these political organizations through spontaneous and volunteer registration or after being targeted and selected by recruitment campaign, therefore they have a deep commitment and sense of group belonging that make their internalized opinions about certain issues, highly representative of what other people alike them think. Political actors can be more or less aware of the values (democratic or antidemocratic) implicit in their opinions and actions. Specific trainings designed for political actors (like the NIMD Schools for Democracy) can provide tools and exercises to facilitate the internalization and practice of democratic values, rule of law and gender sensitive & inclusive politics, however it is necessary to measure how much these topics are internalized before and after the trainings. The data collected with the referred sample of young politicians will provide in the future a standard of comparison of this awareness. Additionally, data collected with similar questionnaires applied before and after each training of the School of Democracy, will offer evidence of any change in the awareness and internalization of such values.
% of political actors that reference the following topics in their manifesto/public statements, other publications - democratic values and/or rule of law and/or gender sensitive & inclusive politics
Related to this outcome and indicator, political actors are attendees (men and women) and alumni (men and women) of the School of Democracy, who are members of political parties and who in the measurement period include democratic values, rule of law and or gender & inclusive politics, dialogue skills, in their political actions, public statements and communications. Percentage (%) is referred to the 100% of young politicians who participated in the survey. Quantitative data: 77% of young politicians consulted expressed respect for inclusion (diversity) values 74% of young politicians consulted expressed acceptance of equal gender inclusion 56% of young politicians consulted participate in different organizational activities (besides politics) 50% of young politicians consulted supported basic elements of rule of law 81% of young politicians consulted support democracy as the best system of government 84% of young politicians consulted appreciate transparency as a value 56% of young politicians consulted responded showing some dialogue skills 42% of young politicians consulted expressed tolerance to political opponents. Qualitative description: A group of 36 young politicians (18 to 35 years old) from five (5) majority and minority political parties participated in a private survey of 24 questions (some of them of multiple items), performed by NIMD Honduras in July 2016, to know their opinions and perceptions about democratic values, rule of law and or gender & inclusive politics, dialogue skills. 53% were women, 47% were men. Most of the questions included in the survey were inspired in questions included in the famous research on democratic political culture performed in Honduras over the last 10 years (2004-2014) by Vanderbilt University (LAPOP), which covers many aspects and elements of the democracy by asking popular opinion in every Latin-American country. The questions included in the survey were focused on obtaining information about inclusion (respect of racial, gender and sexual diversity), participation in different organizations and community issues (not only politics), opinion and support of basic elements of rule of law and democracy (e.g. check-and-balances; support or not of coup d’état or reasons to oust a president); transparency and accountability; dialogue skills and tolerance to other ideas and opinions. Averages and percentages were obtained after tabulation of the answers -from sets of questions- intended to measure each value or characteristic. The values obtained can be compared to similar responses in 2014 LAPOP research (e.g.: tolerance obtained in Honduras a 50.1% and support to democracy got 69.7 in whole Latin America in LAPOP, 2014; compare with 42% and 81% of baseline survey, respectively) and provide data for a private baseline to identify weak or strong attitudes toward democratic values, not only from political actors who are potential participants of NIMD´s Schools of Democracy, but among final attendees of these trainings (at the beginning and after completion of their participation) to evaluate real impact and changes in their attitudes (if any).
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
# of inclusive law making processes, including # of inclusive law making processes with active CS consultation + # consensual law making processes
Under law making processes are included prior negotiations/consultations of laws / public policies and their discussion & approval in Parliament. The laws / public policies should be related to political reform, fiscal reform and climate change including water management. The Civil Society (CS) refers to civic actors like Civil Society Organizations, citizen/interest groups, social movements.
Quantitative data: 1 active CS consultation of law making process in political reform (financing) 1 active CS consultation of law implementing process about women political participation: 50% quota & rank ordering rules (“zipper shape”). 1 active CS consultation of law making process (proposal phase) of fiscal reform 2 active CS consultation of law making process on climatic change and water management Qualitative description: 1. Political reform: there is one (1) law making process going on (related to politics/campaign financing) that includes CS consultation (1) due to the intervention of the OAS Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH). MACCIH is advising and outlining a new normative framework on political/electoral financing, in close effort with the Electoral Affairs Committee, in consultation with political and civil society actors. 2. Women political participation: CS consultation has been effective in the process of formulation and proposal of legislation related to equal political participation of women: a joint proposal of effective regulation of the principle of alternation within the mandatory 50% quota (parity and zipper system) in voting lists in next primary and general elections (2017) has been prepared by the Gender´s Equity Committee of Parliament together with political and CS actors that will be decided up at the end of 2016. Consultation of CS is currently happening (1). 3. Fiscal reform: The Executive branch (Presidency) has prepared a new Tributary Code to reform fiscal issues, after seven (7) months of socialization with different stakeholders. This proposal will be discussed and approved by Parliament in the second semester of 2016. A platform of CS actors and Group for the promotion of Fiscal Dialogue (GPDF) has demanded (July 2016) an inclusive process of discussion within the Parliament before its approval (at the time of the preparation of this baseline is not clear if Parliament will assign this relevant fiscal instrument to the Budget Committee or if it is going to create a special Committee). 4. Climate change (includes water management): climate change and water management affairs had an important boost in 2014 with the enactment of Climate Change Act (Environment and Climate Change Committee was involved) and in 2013 with the approval of Water and Sanitation Sector Law (2013); both lawmaking processes were done by Parliament and included active participation and consultation of CS actors. Currently, there are not specific lawmaking processes going on, though, there are strong critics of the public policy process following the implementation of the act, led by the Environment Ministry (MiAmbiente), which apparently lacks enough CS participation and consultation. On the other hand, Water management legal provisions promote decentralization of water management to local governments and requires active CS consultation during their implementation at local level. Climate change Law (2014) making process included a process of consultation with civic actors, led by the Inter-Agency Technical Committee on Climate Change (CTICC), responsible for the development of the National Climate Change Strategy (ENCC) in 2010 (the Strategy had an extensive process of national consultation, which included different regions).
Safe (and institutionalized) space for dialogue between all relevant political (and civic) actors
# of structural changes opening up space for greater engagement by political and civic actors, including # of structural changes and new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors + # of laws and mechanisms ensuring safe engagement between political and civic actors;
We understand # of structural changes and mechanisms as the number of changes in laws/bills, regulations, public policies and proposals, that rule or provide procedures for consultation, representation or direct participation (inclusion) possibilities of diverse political and civic actors in law and policy making processes. Political actors refer to political parties and political movements; civic actors (also known as Civil Society -CS) include Civil Society Organizations, citizen/interest groups, social movements. Quantitative data: • Laws, bills, regulations, public policies, proposals formulated 2 constitutional provisions for consultation and direct participation and they are: articles 5 and 213, related to plebiscite, referenda and “citizen´s law initiative”. 2 laws regulating citizen´s participation mechanisms (1 at national level, 1 at municipalities level). 0 provisions for mandatory public consultation in National Congress Organic Act. 0 Constitutional provisions for public policy making. 1 law for public policies framework. • Laws, bills, regulations, public policies, proposals implemented 0 Plebiscites or Referenda (national level) 0 Plebiscites (municipal level) 1 citizen´s initiative (law reform proposal) 7 public policies (national level) Qualitative description: There are two (2) constitutional provisions (art. 5 and art. 213) that allow direct participation of any group of citizens in the law making process and its regulation Act (Citizen´s Participation Mechanisms Act, 2013). A group of 3,000 citizens can submit a bill proposal to Parliament to be discussed and, if supported by parliamentarians, approved (“citizen´s law initiative”); this provision is part of a group of mechanisms for direct people´s participation (art. 5) which include plebiscite and referendum (2% of citizens registered in national electoral census can ask for it to Parliament). Citizen´s initiative has been used only once (1) since this mechanism was enshrined in Constitution (2011) and no national plebiscite and referendum has been organized ever (0). Plebiscite exists at municipal level since 1990 and proved to be effective to support some municipal decisions (such as banning alcoholic beverage sales); however, its usage diminished over the last decade mainly because of implementation costs (none during the last year-0). The lawmaking process established by the 1982 Constitution and regulations included within National Congress Organic Act (2014) DO NOT require parliamentarians, alone or integrated to Congressional Commissions, to consult civic actors during the discussion or approval of new legislation. Nonetheless, lately the selection and appointment of senior state officials and some lawmaking processes included more political and civic actors, especially if the law is potentially conflictive and if there is external cooperation involved in the issue (e.g.: public televised audiences and hearings during selection and appointment of candidates to high positions -like Supreme Court; or last year, regarding a new proposal of criminal code which has been under wide civic consultation: the technical assistance to this process has been provided by the Spanish International Cooperation Agency and the Agency demanded it as a condition to grant the assistance). Currently, there are 29 ordinary Congressional Committees responsible for many and varied issues of public interest. The Congress Organic Act establishes as mandatory the integration of representatives from all parties included in the Parliament in ordinary and special Committees, allowing multiparty participation within the committees (29 of the ordinary ones are multiparty integrated). Although the integration of committees and their internal debates are multiparty orientated, during debates and proposals enactments in Parliament ‘plenaries prevails the exclusion of opposition parties’ opinions and inputs, as a consequence of the influence of the ruling governing alliance between the National Party and the Liberal Party. There are no constitutional provisions established for public policy making (0). In 2013, the Parliament approved one (1) Act creating a public policy framework on social matters (Public policy framework law on social matters), which established -among others- procedures to guarantee inclusion and coordination as well as mandatory participation of all relevant social actors (civic actors) in areas of governmental social action (for example, social protection, social investment, social economy, social development, social integration). Before and after this law enactment, at least seven (7) public policies were discussed and approved with active participation of CS actors (among them -most relevant- 2nd Plan of equality and gender equality in Honduras 2010, Social Protection Policy 2012, Human Rights Public Policy 2013), though, according to key informants, on a regular basis social actors have little influence over public policy making due to fragmentation and reduced effective lobbying.
Improved capability to attract and relate of political actors
In Honduras, political actors -from official and opposition parties- have currently limited capability to relate to each other and to CS. To overcome polarization and mistrust resulting from the 2013 general elections, the ruling National Party *(without a majority in Parliament)- managed to establish a governing alliance (1) with the Liberal party (27 seats and former main opposite party within the traditional bipartisan system), other minority parties and defectors from opposition parties, to take control of the legislative branch and the legislative process. This tactical alliance has proved to be fruitful for both parties: it helped them to enact laws, to approve Budgetary provisions, to control the board of the Parliament and decisive Ordinary Committees and as the pivotal base of the election of the new Supreme Court of Justice (together with other minority political forces). On the other hand, the governing alliance diminished the political influence and possibilities of the other two main opposition parties (Libre and PAC) However, in some relevant occasions Liberal party PMs did not follow this dynamic -blocking opposition parties- and voted together with Libre and PAC (against a constitutional reform and the appointment of a high state official) proving that the alliance with National Party has limits. The capability to attract and relate to CS actors for the enactment of legislation and its performance on policy goals is limited and it depends mainly on the issue. That is the case of relevant themes for NIMD.
# of active alliances between political actors and/or between political actors and CS stakeholders
Active alliance means alliance on political reform, women´s political participation, fiscal reform and climate change including water management, among political actor and/or between political actors and CS Stakeholders, which has been productive (visible or not) through publications, position papers, policy proposals, manifestos, meeting reports. Quantitative data: Alliances between political actors 1 governing alliance between National (ruling) and Liberal (opposition) party in Parliament to control legislative processes. Over the last year, political alliances between political actors have been mainly pragmatic: National Party (ruling) succeeded in maintaining the governing alliance with the Liberal party (opposition) within Parliament. The election of a new Supreme Court (15 magistrates in January-February 2016) represented a big challenge for both parties because a qualified majority voting was needed; however, both parties finally succeeded in getting the 2/3 of the votes (86 from 128 seats), by adding votes from minority parties and defectors from opposition parties. 0 active alliance between political actors to perform an integral political reform. 1 active alliance between political actors to support the enactment of politics/campaign financing law. 1 active alliance between political actors to implement 50% quota (gender parity) and rank ordering rules (“zipper shape”) (via regulation). 0 active alliance between political actors to approve new fiscal and tax reforms. 0 active alliance between political actors on climatic change and water management issues. Alliances between political actors and CS • 0 active alliance between political actors and CS stakeholders to perform an integral political reform. • 0 active alliance between political actors and CS stakeholders to support the enactment of politics/campaign financing law. In political reform (to July 2016), besides the reform on politics/campaign financing supported and technically assisted by MACCIH (1), there is no possibility for an active alliance (0), between political actors or between political actor and CS stakeholders to discuss nor approve an integral political reform. CS stakeholders did not produce relevant position papers showing joint opinions or alliances about political/electoral reform or campaign financing. • 1 active alliance between political actors and CS stakeholders to implement 50% quota (gender parity) and rank ordering rules (“zipper shape”) in law reform Political actors and CS stakeholders have been very active (and proactive) in showing public joint positions (policy proposals and manifestos), between multiparty political actors (1) and between political and CS actors (1). The need of implementation of an important law reform that obliges to incorporate 50% women quota, in alternate positions, in electoral lists for the 2017 elections, provided an opportunity for women MPs, politicians and CS actors to work together and propose regulation. • 1 partial active alliance between political actors and CS stakeholders on fiscal and tax reforms. In tax (fiscal) reform, there is no evidence of a broad and permanent alliance between political and CS actors. However, the Executive branch introduced a bill into Parliament which had previous, partial, consultation with CS stakeholders; active alliances between political actors and between political actors and CS stakeholders are foreseen in order to have consensus for a new Tax Code • 0 active alliance between political actors and/or political actors and CS stakeholders on climatic change and water management issues. climatic change and water management, there is no active alliance between political actors nor relevant ones between political actors and CS stakeholders (0).
Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors
Normally, in Honduras political parties have very little interest in consulting, collaborating and harmonizing their political behavior with other civic actors. This characteristic is a consequence of several factors, some historical, mainly related to the predominant bipartisan and patronage system of the last half century, as well as the prevailing authoritarian rule model, that prevented the development of a truly democratic arena within the country, which would have favored the strengthening of democratic political practices (like democratic dialogue and legitimate popular representation) among the main political institutions and other stakeholders. Civic actors (CS organizations, organized groups of citizens related to specific interests, social movements) gained access and influence to parliamentary representatives and executive officials during the first decade of 21st century, as a consequence of demands from international development cooperation to democratize the socio-political scenario in Honduras (Parliament used to negotiate a legislative Agenda with thematic CS sectors). Civic actors influence decreased substantially, mainly because of a diminished lobbying capacity, polarization after the 2009 coup d’état and the lack of support from a wide base of people (including social pressure), that became obvious to political actors. Sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors depend more on personal initiative and leadership of political and civic actors or their lobbying capacities. For example, stakeholders from private sector and from other economic and productive areas, show their influence by using lobbying strategies to consult and obtain collaboration from political actors which ease collaboration in harmonizing legislation and public policies. Actions of coordination, dialogue and consultation between political actors and between political actors and civic actors, related to political reform, women´s political participation, fiscal reform and climate change including water management (not exclusive), usually happen through bilateral meetings, thematic debates, fora and encounters between political and civil society. • Political reform is facing obstacles, mainly because of lack of political consensus, interest and trust between political actors; this lack of collaboration extends its effects to the exchange of positions and harmonization efforts with civic actors. The only exception is the initiative for a new law on politics/campaign financing (supported by OAS-MACCIH), which has already produced opportunities for collaboration between the parties that participate in the Electoral Reform Committee and some SC actors involved in transparency and accountability issues (at least meeting 1 time per month). • About women´s political participation, consultation and collaboration among and between political and civic actors has increased during the last years, especially for the common goal of the 50% quota (gender parity) and rank ordering rules (“zipper shape”) effective implementation in the 2017 elections; all relevant parties and some feminist organizations have accomplished an important joint work in the revision and proposal of a “gender parity and rank ordering rules” (“zipper shape”) (on certain moments meeting 1 time weekly). • On fiscal reform, collaboration between political actors (ruling and opposition) has been evident in some tax reforms (within Parliament) in order to harmonize proposals and bills (specially tributary Code) and also between some political actors (ruling party) and private stakeholders, as well as some groups of interest (like the Promoter Group of Tax Dialogue, which has been able to meet and have conversations each 2 weeks with the main figures of government, ruling party and opposition parties and relevant MPs (Budget and Finance and External Cooperation Committee). • Finally, climate change and water management issues have become of increasing interest from some minority of the political actors (mainly ruling party), but with different approaches: Climate Change issues show limited consulting and collaboration among political actors and between political actors (in Parliament) and CS actors (sometimes null), mainly because the main actions respond to an external (international) demand, governmental formal actions and laws enactments from Parliament and have not produced a sense of trust and mutual understanding between political actors and CS actors, because of the absence or minimal comprehensive vision on environmental protection from the official sector. On the other hand, Water Management issues respond more and more to a decentralized and local perspective, where collaborative response and participation on the national level is progressively less relevant.
% of political actors who indicate that collaborate with other civic actors at least x times per year
% of political actors who indicate that collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month.
For purposes of the outcome indicator, political actors are political parties integrated in Parliament Committees whose representatives work or coordinate actions together with CS actors (also known as Civil Society -CS, include Civil Society Organizations, citizen/interest groups, social movements), or have interaction and encounters to dialogue about issues of common interest or disagreement. This actions of coordination, dialogue and consultation can be through thematic debates and encounters between political and civil society related to political reform, women´s political participation, fiscal reform and climate change including water management (not exclusive). Quantitative data: 18% of members of Parliament´s Electoral Reform Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. 67% of members of Parliament´s Gender´s Equity Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. 36% of members of Parliament´s Budget´s Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. 44% of members of Parliament´s Finance and External Cooperation Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. 14% of members of Parliament´s Environment and Climate Change Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. Qualitative description: Percentage (quantitative data) is built by dividing the number of relevant political actors related to each issue of public concern (political reform, women´s political participation, fiscal reform and climate change including water management) who collaborate actively with CS actors at least 1 time per month, by the total number of political actor’s time (100). In the current legislative year, there are different share of members of Parliament integrated to specialized Committees, who indicate that they consult civic actors at least one (1) time per month on imminent legislative debates. Highest percentage is related to women´s political participation (67%) issues and tax (44 and 36%) issues; lowest are political reform (18%) issues and climate change and water management (14%) issues. However, data for this indicator should be studied more and in detail.
A level playing field, for all political actors, based on trust, including civic actors wanting to influence politics
Increased trust in the political process by different groups and citizens, including % of Latino and Afro barometer responds
% of LatinoBarometer respondents expressing trust in political parties
Quantitative data: 18% Qualitative description: The most recently available 2015 LatinoBarometer measured public trust of respondents in political parties overall. Collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is very low trust in political parties in Honduras.
NL-KVK-27189542-ILA16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
International Lobby & Advocacy 2016
In the Strategic Partnership (SP) between AWEPA, NIMD and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), International Lobby and Advocacy (ILA) forms a key component. The ultimate goal of the ILA efforts within the context of the Strategic Partnership Programme is to reinforce the in-country lobby and advocacy capacities and activities of implementing partners and (indirectly) civil society organisations in the countries that AWEPA and NIMD work in, with the aim to influence the enabling environment for effective policy influencing. By creating interlinkages between lobby and advocacy activities at the various levels (national, regional and international) and strengthening the policy influencing capacities of local actors, the impact of lobby and advocacy on issues that emanate from national policy agendas is sought to be maximised. Apart from strengthening the lobby and advocacy capacities of local actors, the SP sets out two broad agendas for ILA for 2016-2020: 1) to ensure that the importance of an enabling environment for lobby and advocacy is recognised, including the critical role of parties and parliaments to foster peace and stability and to reflect this in international and regional policy and legal and regulatory frameworks; and 2) to influence international and regional policies on political party support and parliamentary strengthening, including the allocation of sufficient donor funds.
NIMD
200000
80000
32168
# of adaptations in international and regional funding instruments, policies and frameworks that reflect and support the role of parties and parliaments in international development
# of adaptations in international and regional funding instruments, policies and frameworks that reflect and support the role of parties and parliaments in international development
# ILA lobby events/initiatives
# ILA lobby events/initiatives
NL-KVK-27189542-FCAS16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Knowledge development for fragile settings (FCAS) 2016
In order to strengthen NIMD’s work in fragile and conflict-prone settings, applied research will be initiated by the Knowledge and Innovation Unit in consultation with programme staff and partners. Generally, the aim of such research will be to better understand the root causes of destabilisation in fragile settings, as well as cross-border issues and regional dynamics, and specifically, their impact on the functioning of the political system, its actors and the democratic culture. The outcomes of these research projects will be used to inform national and regional programme strategies, and to strengthen the NIMD programme interventions at various levels. Themes that could be considered include the scarcity of, and access to, natural resources; growing inequality; the rapidly growing youth cohort and its effects on socio-economic and political stability; cross-border conflicts; and dynamics related to illicit networks, drug trafficking and terrorism. Based on NIMD’s experience in working with political actors in fragile and conflict settings over the past ten years, six focus areas have been identified that particularly affect NIMD’s work in these settings. Under the Dialogue for Stability programme, NIMD aims to deepen its expertise, skills and tools on each of these six focus areas: i. Trust building between political rivals: ii. Supporting the conversion of former armed movements into political parties: iii. Fostering inclusive political settlements iv. Working in synchronicity with international conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions v. Advancing women’s political participation vi. Understanding the impact of illicit networks on politics in fragile and conflict affected settings.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIMD
NIMD
NIMD
+31 70 311 5464
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
440000
84455
NL-KVK-27189542-KNOINN16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Knowledge and Innovation Programme 2016
In the period 2016-2020, the NIMD country programmes will remain at the heart of NIMD’s work; NIMD is convinced that transformational change processes can only be realised and sustained through country programmes. To inform its programmes, and in particular to design effective strategies that respond to complex and rapidly changing political environments, NIMD will further deepen its knowledge base, invest in its skills-set and develop tools and instruments regarding interparty dialogue, capacity strengthening, political culture, gender equality & inclusion. As part of its knowledge agenda, NIMD will also specifically work on strengthening its strategies, skills and expertise tailored to working in fragile and conflict affected settings in recognition that working in such sensitive contexts requires a tailored approach. Furthermore, to embrace new thinking about participatory democracy and the effect of modern technology on citizens’ engagement in policy and political processes, NIMD will also invest in innovation.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIMD
NIMD
NIMD
+31 70 311 5464
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
440000
23755
87545
NL-KVK-27189542-LEB16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Lebanon Programme 2016
Lebanon programme 2016 - exploration phase
50000
28756
15440
NL-KVK-27189542-KUR16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Kurdistan Programme 2016
Kurdistan programme 2016 - exploration phase
50000
6508
23280
NL-KVK-27189542-JOR16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Jordan Programme 2016
Jordan programme 2016 - exploration phase
50000
30382
15440
NL-KVK-27189542-ISRPAL16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Israel/Palestine exchange Programme 2016
Israel/Palestine exchange programme 2016 - exploration phase
50000
9097
23280
NL-KVK-27189542-LEA16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Learning Agenda 2016
In the Strategic Partnership (SP) between AWEPA, NIMD and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), joint learning is a key priority. The learning agenda under the SP refers to the creation, documentation and transfer of knowledge in relation to the main subject of the SP: the role of political parties and parliaments in creating an conducive environment for policy influencing. The learning agenda for the SP intends to ensure that the experiences, knowledge and best practices that are accumulated in the programme countries are not only tracked and systematically documented, but also deliberately showcased and shared between the MFA, AWEPA, NIMD and their local implementing partners. This is achieved through research and development, monitoring and evaluation, sharing of best practices, peer learning and a continuous reflection on the programme interventions in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. The learning agenda under the SP provides an unique opportunity to combine and capitalise on the individual experiences of the partners, with the aim to strengthen the country programmes and where applicable, the International Lobby and Advocacy (ILA) agenda. Three general learning objectives have been identified for the SP Programme: Objective 1) To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes and the innovation of programme intervention strategies Objective 2) To strengthen country programmes by deepening our knowledge base on the following three themes: - the political party-parliament nexus - the shrinking democratic space - the role of parties and parliaments in the national budgeting and policymaking cycle. Objective 3) To maximise impact through peer learning, partnerships and networking
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIMD
NIMD
AWEPA
NIMD
+31 70 311 5464
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
200000
94924
NL-KVK-27189542-FUNPOS16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Fundraising and Positioning Programme 2016
In addition to the programme objectives that form the basis of the Dialogue and Stability programme, NIMD -in consultation with the Ministry- has decided to include an operational objective focussing on diversifying the funding base towards a broader range of donors in order to ensure the financial health and stability of the organisation. NIMD´s fundraising strategy for the coming five years will revolve around two ambitions: 1) diversification of the donor portfolio and 2) securing flexible, multi-annual funding. We realise that the combination will sometimes be contradictory, but both are important for NIMD. Diversification is needed to increase NIMD’s financial resilience and flexible multi-annual funding will help us to maintain our niche position. To achieve our fundraising ambitions, NIMD will focus on positioning; securing programmatic and thematic funding through multi-lateral and bilateral donors as well as private foundations; creating leverage and professionalising NIMD’s fundraising efforts and financial contract management.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIMD
NIMD
NIMD
+31 70 311 5464
info@nimd.org
http://www.nimd.org
NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands
150000
50685
NL-KVK-27189542-PME16
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 2016
Measuring concrete results of programmes aimed at strengthening capacities of political actors and democracy has over time shown to be rather challenging. Despite substantive investments made in the last decades, instruments and methodologies remain limited. NIMD attaches great value to Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) and continuously invest in developing and refining tools and innovative approaches to improve their ability to measure results. Trial-and-error is needed to strengthen the measurement of the results of our programmes because the work we do is, due to the many external (political) factors that influence it, not easily planned or measured. NIMD will carefully follow innovations in the field and invest in research and development of new ways to capture change brought about by their programmes. In addition to that, NIMD will invest in the capacity building of local partners for PME and the development of new tools and instruments for data collection.
NIMD
99900
40000
17009
40000
27873
40000